

## **Dial, Janise**

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### **COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT (RCW 51.08.013; RCW 51.08.180(1))**

#### **Parking area exclusion (RCW 51.08.013)**

#### **Personal comfort doctrine**

When injured in the parking lot while engaged in an activity to which the personal comfort doctrine applies (smoking), the worker remained in the course of employment and the parking lot exception did not require that the claim be denied. ...*In re Janise Dial*, BIA Dec., 01 17217 (2003)

Scroll down for order.



1 On January 8, 2001, Ms. Dial slipped during a morning rest break. She was walking to her  
2 car so she could smoke a cigarette. As a result of her fall, she suffered a low back strain. Her  
3 employer, R. F. Taplett Fruit Co. (Taplett), neither encouraged nor supported smoking, but limited  
4 the locations where employees could smoke on its property. By smoking in her car, Ms. Dial was  
5 not furthering any Taplett business interest. She was merely trying to keep warm on a cold winter  
6 day. Taplett allowed workers to smoke during rest breaks in their cars in its parking lot.  
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10 In these circumstances, we conclude that the application of the personal comfort doctrine  
11 determines that Ms. Dial was in the course of her employment when she fell. The personal comfort  
12 doctrine includes, within the definition of "course of employment," activities that are incidental,  
13 minor deviations from work duties. This doctrine allows coverage for an injury that takes place  
14 while an employee is ministering to personal comfort needs, such as eating or drinking. Under this  
15 doctrine, an employee who is injured while attending to a basic need is within the course of his or  
16 her employment and is, therefore, eligible for industrial insurance benefits. *In re Phillip Carstens,*  
17 *Jr.*, BIIA Dec., 89 0723 (1990); *In re Ken Bezley*, Dckt. Nos. 95 5865 & 95 6356 (January 27, 1997).  
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21 The general rule concerning the personal comfort doctrine, as stated by Professor Larson, is  
22 as follows:  
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25 Employees who, within the time and space limits of their employment, engage in  
26 acts which minister to personal comfort do not thereby leave the course of  
27 employment, unless the extent of the departure is so great that an intent to abandon  
28 the job temporarily may be inferred, or unless, in some jurisdictions, the method  
29 chosen is so unusual and unreasonable that the conduct cannot be considered an  
30 incident of the employment.

31 2 A. and L. Larson, *Larson's Workers' Compensation Law* § 21 (2002).  
32

33 We noted in *Carstens* that under the personal comfort doctrine, activities such as eating, obtaining  
34 a drink, smoking, or going to the bathroom are frequently considered to have occurred in the course  
35 of employment. *Carstens*, at 13. Practically all jurisdictions that have addressed smoking hold that  
36 smoking does not constitute a departure from employment. *Larson's* § 21.04. We believe a person  
37 should be considered to be within the personal comfort doctrine when smoking a cigarette if the  
38 activity is reasonably incidental to his or her job duties.  
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42 We conclude that when Ms. Dial went outside to smoke a cigarette during a paid break, she  
43 did not leave the course of her employment because she engaged in a personal comfort that was  
44 reasonably incidental to her employment. The employer would not allow her to smoke within its  
45 facility. During her break, in order to smoke, she went outside as required and then to her car to  
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1 keep warm. Nothing in that activity suggests that her departure from her job duties was so great  
2 that it evidenced intent to abandon the job. Her activities were within the reasonable time and  
3 space limits of her employment. She remained in the course of her employment when she slipped  
4 and fell in the parking lot. We wish to be clear, however, that although we find Ms. Dial's injury  
5 covered in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that personal comfort activities a  
6 worker engages in during paid break periods, whether on or off the jobsite, **necessarily** requires a  
7 finding that the activity is within the course of employment.  
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11 The Department, in its Petition for Review, contends that the personal comfort doctrine  
12 cannot be used to overcome the statutory bar to coverage contained in RCW 51.08.013, which  
13 generally prohibits some claims for injuries stemming from parking lot accidents. Pursuant to the  
14 statute, a worker is considered to be in the course of employment when coming to or going from  
15 work on the jobsite. A worker is not considered in the course of employment if injured in the  
16 parking lot when going to or coming from work because the parking lot is excluded from the  
17 definition of the jobsite. RCW 51.08.013(1). The rule should not be applied here, however,  
18 because a worker is neither coming to nor going from work if they are within the time and space  
19 constraints of the personal comfort doctrine; the course of employment has not been interrupted.  
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22 The Department relies on *Bergsma v. Department of Labor & Indus.*, 33 Wn. App. 609  
23 (1983) to support rejection of the claim. That decision covers the issue of an injury during a lunch  
24 break; it does not control application of the personal comfort doctrine. Lunch breaks are not the  
25 same as personal comfort breaks and are treated differently in statute and case law. The foremost  
26 distinction is that, unlike the worker ministering to a personal comfort, a worker is generally not  
27 considered to be in the course of employment when on a lunch break. *Tipsword v. Department of*  
28 *Labor & Indus.*, 52 Wn.2d 79 (1958). If not otherwise in the course of employment, a worker may  
29 be covered for an injury occurring during a lunch break only because of the statutory provision that  
30 covers workers while they are on a lunch break on the employer's jobsite. RCW 51.32.015.  
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33 In *Bergsma*, the worker was not covered when on a lunch break because he left the jobsite.  
34 He was injured in the parking lot. The employer's parking lot was not considered part of the jobsite  
35 pursuant to the provisions of RCW 51.08.013. When injured, Mr. Bergsma was not otherwise in the  
36 course of employment, and coverage of the injury was denied. We note, however, that the parking  
37 lot exception to the jobsite is not a bar to coverage for all injuries occurring in a parking lot. It only  
38 limits coverage for injuries that would otherwise be allowed as part of the "coming and going" rule  
39 defined by RCW 51.08.013. *Bergsma*, at 615. Likewise, the parking lot exception does not limit  
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1 coverage for injuries sustained in parking lots that occur while the worker is in the course of  
2 employment. *Bolden v. Department of Transportation*, 95 Wn. App. 218 at 221 (1999); *In re Julie*  
3 *Trusley*, BIIA Dec., 93 3124 (1994); *In re Joseph Buchheit*, BIIA Dec., 88 2674 (1989).

4  
5 Lunchtime travel from the jobsite is classified in the same category as travel before or after  
6 work, and is subject to the coming and going rule, with its exception. *Bergsma*, at 616. The worker  
7 who takes a lunch break away from the jobsite deviates from the course of employment; the worker  
8 merely attending to personal comfort within the time and space limits of their employment does not.  
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11 We conclude that Ms. Dial was in the course of her employment when injured because of  
12 application of the personal comfort doctrine to the facts of this case. The assertion that the  
13 personal comfort doctrine does not apply to accidents occurring in a parking lot is incorrect and  
14 would be an unwarranted extension of the parking lot exception to circumstances where a worker is  
15 neither coming to nor going from work. Once we determine that the personal comfort doctrine  
16 applies, we, by necessity, determine that the worker had not left the course of employment. It  
17 follows that the worker is neither coming to nor going from work. If a worker remains in the course  
18 of employment it is irrelevant where the injury occurred.  
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21 Based on consideration of the Petition for Review and the record in this appeal, we have  
22 determined that the Department's June 29, 2001 order rejecting the claim is incorrect and must be  
23 reversed and the matter remanded to the Department with direction to allow the claim.  
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### 25 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

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30 1. On January 16, 2001, Janise A. Dial filed an application for benefits with  
31 the Department of Labor and Industries, alleging that she had been  
32 injured on January 8, 2001, during the course of her employment with  
33 the R.F. Taplett Fruit Co. (hereafter Taplett). On February 12, 2001, the  
34 Department rejected the claim for benefits, on the grounds that the injury  
35 for which she sought coverage occurred in Taplett's parking lot and that  
36 RCW 51.08.013 excluded her from obtaining industrial insurance  
37 benefits. Ms. Dial protested the order on April 9, 2001, but the  
38 Department affirmed the order on June 29, 2001. On August 30, 2001,  
39 Ms. Dial filed a protest of the June 29, 2001 order with the Department.  
40 On September 21, 2001, the Department forwarded her protest to the  
41 Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals as an appeal. On October 3,  
42 2001, the Board issued an order granting the appeal, assigning it Docket  
43 No. 01 17217.  
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45 2. On January 8, 2001, Taplett employed Ms. Dial as a worker in the fruit  
46 packing business it operated near Wenatchee, Washington.  
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- 1 3. On and before January 8, 2001, Taplett disallowed employees from  
2 smoking tobacco in its work building. The company allowed employees  
3 to smoke during work breaks at areas that were located outside both the  
4 front and back entrances to the building. The building's roof eaves were  
5 the only cover over these areas.  
6
- 7 4. During work breaks, Taplett customarily allowed employees to go to  
8 their cars in the employee parking lot in order to rest, smoke, eat, or  
9 drink. The employee parking lot was located immediately outside of the  
10 back door of Taplett's building.  
11
- 12 5. On January 8, 2001, Taplett's employee parking lot was covered by  
13 snow and ice that had accumulated during the night. The outside  
14 temperature during the morning of January 8, 2001, was well below  
15 freezing. Ms. Dial felt she would have become uncomfortably cold if she  
16 stood outside for the length of time she needed to smoke a cigarette.  
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- 18 6. On January 8, 2001, during her morning break, Ms. Dial walked to her  
19 car in Taplett's employee parking lot for the sole purpose of smoking a  
20 cigarette. During her trip to the car, Ms. Dial slipped on the ice and  
21 snow that was in the parking lot. She hurt her low back as she moved  
22 suddenly to avoid falling.  
23
- 24 7. On January 9, 2001, Ms. Dial sought medical treatment for her low back  
25 symptoms. She was diagnosed as having strained her back when she  
26 slipped in Taplett's parking lot.  
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- 28 8. On January 8, 2001, when Ms. Dial slipped in Taplett's parking lot, she  
29 was engaged in a personal comfort reasonably incidental to the course  
30 of her employment.  
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### **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

- 32 1. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals has jurisdiction over the  
33 parties to and the subject matter of this appeal, which was filed within  
34 the time limitation allowed by RCW 51.52.060.  
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- 36 2. On January 8, 2001, Ms. Dial was in the course of her employment,  
37 within the meaning of RCW 51.08.013, when she slipped in the  
38 employer's parking lot and injured her low back.  
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- 40 3. On January 8, 2001, Ms. Dial suffered an industrial injury within the  
41 meaning of RCW 51.08.100.  
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1 4. The June 29, 2001 order of the Department of Labor and Industries is  
2 reversed. This matter is remanded to the Department with directions to  
3 allow the claim and take such further action as required by the law and  
4 the facts.

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6 It is so **ORDERED**.

7 Dated this 26th day of March, 2003.  
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10 BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS  
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12  
13 /s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
14 THOMAS E. EGAN Chairperson  
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18 /s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
19 FRANK E. FENNERTY, JR. Member  
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23 /s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
24 JUDITH E. SCHURKE Member  
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