Rickey, Chancy

VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION

Return-to-work offer

RCW 51.32.096(2)(c) requires that the employment offered as a return-to-work offer be consistent with the worker's documented physical and mental restrictions as provided by the worker's health care provider. This means that a person hired for purposes of performing an independent medical examination or physical capacities evaluation is not the worker's health care provider, and decisions involving validity of a return-to-work offer cannot be made in reliance on them. ....In re Chancy Rickey, BIIA Dec., 18 15264 (2019)

Scroll down for order.
BEFORE THE BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS
STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN RE: CHANCY T. RICKEY

) DOCKET NOS. 18 13570 & 18 15264

CLAIM NO. BA-08508

) DECISION AND ORDER

In 2016, Chancy Rickey injured his back while working as a technician for Mechanical and Control Services (MCS). He had previously been diagnosed with mental health conditions that were in remission at the time of the injury, but treatment for his industrial injury aggravated the mental health conditions. The Department had accepted responsibility for those conditions under the claim. MCS offered a light-duty position that took into account Mr. Rickey’s physical limitations but did not address psychiatric restrictions. On February 6, 2018, the Department of Labor and Industries (Department) issued a payment order affirming denial of time-loss compensation for the period after October 24, 2017. On April 20, 2018, the Department closed Mr. Rickey’s claim with a Category 2 dorso-lumbar/lumbosacral permanent partial disability award. Mr. Rickey requested the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals find he was temporarily totally disabled from October 25, 2017, through April 19, 2018, and permanently totally disabled as of April 20, 2018, or in the alternative, provide an increased permanent partial disability award. At the hearing, Mr. Rickey withdrew the issue regarding whether he required further treatment. The Department and MCS supported the orders on appeal. Our industrial appeals judge concluded Mr. Rickey’s condition is fixed and stable, and he is not entitled to further medical treatment. The judge found the light-duty job MCS offered to Mr. Rickey was valid and he was able to perform the job. In reaching the decision regarding Mr. Rickey’s mental health condition, the judge relied entirely on the psychiatric opinion of independent medical examiner Dr. Schneider. Mr. Rickey contends such reliance was incorrect. We agree. We hold that without vocational retraining, Mr. Rickey is unemployable given his physical and mental limitations, and lack of transferable skills. The February 6, 2018, and April 20, 2018 Department orders are REVERSED AND REMANDED.

DISCUSSION

On January 14, 2016, while working as an HVAC technician for Mechanical & Control Services (MCS), Chancy Rickey injured his low back. Weeks after his injury, on February 1, 2016, Mr. Rickey returned to MCS to perform part-time light-duty work. The work ended on approximately May 25, 2016.

In 2010, Mr. Rickey suffered a mental health breakdown and was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, type 1 (bipolar), and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). His condition was severe and
prevented him from working for a number of years. He sought treatment in 2010, successfully
recovered, and required no medication or treatment after 2014.

In April 2016, Mr. Rickey underwent a steroid injection to treat his injury symptoms. The
steroid injection aggravated his preexisting bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, and PTSD, and caused
him to enter a manic state. In a separate Proposed Decision and Order, one of our hearings judges
affirmed the February 16, 2017 Department order accepting responsibility for Mr. Rickey's bipolar
disorder as aggravated by the industrial injury.¹ Despite undergoing psychiatric treatment following
the injection, Mr. Rickey reports ongoing bipolar symptoms. He and his father testified his mental
health condition is severe and he requires significant help to care for his children and his home.

On September 10, 2016, Mr. Rickey underwent an independent medical examination (IME)
with psychiatrist, Richard L. Schneider, M.D. Dr. Schneider concluded Mr. Rickey's pre-injury bipolar
disorder was temporarily aggravated by the steroid, and the aggravation was concluded, so he had
no remaining mental restrictions.

On September 19, 2016, Mr. Rickey was referred for consultation with Paul S. Darby, M.D.,
an occupational and environmental medicine physician. Dr. Darby detailed Mr. Rickey's physical
restrictions, including 30 minutes of sitting up to four hours a day, 30 minutes of standing up to two
hours a day, 20 minutes of walking up to two hours a day, and sitting, standing, or walking,
alternatively, for up to eight hours a day. Standing or walking was restricted to 40 minutes at a time,
up to four hours a day. For sitting, he required an ergonomic chair with lumbar support. He could
work on ladders, climb ladders, and climb stairs, up to 10 percent of the workday. He could twist at
the trunk, bend, stoop, kneel, squat, and crawl up to 20 feet for one to three hours a day, up to
13 percent of the workday. His ability to reach forward with both arms was unrestricted. He could
reach from waist to shoulder, and work above the shoulders, up to six hours for a workday. He could
constantly use a keyboard, bend his wrists, grasp forcefully, handle or grasp materials, and
manipulate his fingers or hands. He could operate the foot controls on his left side up to three hours
a day, on the right side up to six hours a day. Low impact vibration was unrestricted for his
extremities. He could lift floor to waist: 30 pounds occasionally, 15 pounds frequently; waist to
shoulder: 25 pounds occasionally, 12 pounds frequently; knee to waist: 30 pounds occasionally, and
15 pounds frequently. He could carry a 20 pound object a distance of 50 feet occasionally; push a

¹ Docket No. 17 12562. After the parties reached a settlement during the superior court appeal, the May 14, 2018 Board
order denying PFR is final and binding.
30 pound object a distance of 50 feet occasionally; and pull a 35 pound object a distance of 50 feet occasionally. Dr. Darby confirmed, at the time of claim closure, Mr. Rickey's physical condition was at maximum medical improvement (MMI). Dr. Darby reviewed job assessments to potentially return Mr. Rickey to work, and approved the job of dispatcher with ergonomic and sit/stand options. Dr. Darby's return to work conclusions did not include consideration of Mr. Rickey's mental health condition.

On December 6, 2017, Mr. Rickey underwent an IME with psychiatrist Jeff Hart, M.D. Dr. Hart diagnosed Mr. Rickey with bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, PTSD, panic disorder without agoraphobia, and ADHD, all preexisting and aggravated by the industrial injury. Dr. Hart concluded Mr. Rickey was ready for vocational training, but to return to work with MCS would cause his mental condition to deteriorate. If Mr. Rickey accepted the job offer, his anxiety level would increase and further diminish his ability to function at work. Dr. Hart concluded Mr. Rickey's mental condition was consistent with Category 3 permanent impairment under WAC 296-20-340.

Mr. Rickey was primarily treated by Michael Johnson, M.D., a family and sports medicine physician. Dr. Johnson testified to Mr. Rickey's physical condition, which Mr. Rickey does not dispute. Dr. Johnson concluded returning to work at MCS, consistent with the job offer, was not medically appropriate for Mr. Rickey in light of his mental health issues. The job offer was inconsistent with Mr. Rickey's emotional condition, and Dr. Johnson agreed with Dr. Hart's conclusions as to Mr. Rickey's mental condition.

Following his March 21, 2017 laminectomy, Mr. Rickey experienced improved physical symptoms, concluded treatment, and met with a vocational counselor in an effort to return to work. He underwent a Functional Capacity Evaluation.

On September 29, 2017, the Department found Mr. Rickey eligible for vocational plan development services. The vocational counselor determined Mr. Rickey was not employable, and needed retraining. On October 11, 2017, MCS offered Mr. Rickey a permanent light-duty job. The Department found the job offer valid, and closed Mr. Rickey's claim with a Category 2 dorso-lumbar permanent partial disability.

The job offer did not include information regarding mental requirements. As such, Mr. Rickey contends the job offer is invalid under RCW 51.32.099(2)(c), which allows an employer to pre-empt a worker's entry into vocational retraining by providing the worker with a valid light-duty job offer. "To be valid, the offer must be for bona fide employment with the employer of injury, consistent with the
worker's documented physical and mental restrictions as provided by the worker's health care provider." Mr. Rickey contends his mental restrictions preclude the MCS job offer, and as such the offer is invalid.

While a number of elements are required for a job offer to be valid, this case focuses on Mr. Rickey's mental restrictions. We have addressed this issue in previous cases, including *In re Steven M. Laing*, in which we specified:

RCW 51.32.099(2) does not require that a physician sign off on the job; it requires that the employment be "consistent with the worker's documented physical and mental restrictions as provided by the worker's health care provider." This means that a person hired for purposes of performing an independent medical examination or physical capacities evaluation, for that matter, is not the worker's health care provider, and decisions involving validity of a return-to-work offer cannot be made in reliance on them.

Here, Dr. Hart and Dr. Schneider are both IME physicians. They provided no care to Mr. Rickey. According to RCW 51.32.099(2)(c), and the current version of the statute, RCW 51.32.096(2)(c), their opinions cannot be the basis for finding the MCS job offer valid. Dr. Darby and Dr. Johnson are the only testifying care providers, and Dr. Johnson is the only testifying care provider who testified as to the validity of the job offer taking into consideration Mr. Rickey's mental condition. We find his conclusions are the most persuasive.

Dr. Johnson concluded the MCS job offer was not medically appropriate for Mr. Rickey in light of his mental health issues. The only mental restrictions discernable from the available record are those identified by Dr. Hart in his explanation of why Mr. Rickey's mental condition is consistent with a Category 3 permanent impairment, including moments of morbid apprehension, loss of interest in usual daily activities, fear motivated behavior causing mild interference with daily life, and periodic lack of appropriate mental control—all while at his best level of functioning. These are incorporated into Dr. Johnson's testimony as he stated he concurred with Dr. Hart's conclusions. Based on this, the MCS job offer was invalid per RCW 51.32.096(2)(c).

On finding the job offer valid, the Department closed Mr. Rickey's claim. While the record confirms Mr. Rickey is ready to participate in vocational retraining to return him to work, he is now entitled to total disability compensation. As we have repeatedly held, "the Department runs a risk

---

2 RCW 51.32.096(2)(c).
3 Dckt. No. 08 12843 (May 20, 2009), (Emphasis added.)
when closing a claim," when it determines a worker can return to work.\textsuperscript{4} After the Department has
determined the worker is not totally disabled and the determination has been appealed to the Board, the worker's occupational retraining prognosis is no longer a factor in determining whether the worker
is totally disabled.\textsuperscript{5} This result is unfortunate particularly given the Industrial Insurance Act's goal of
returning injured workers to work. The result, however, hinges on the evolution of Mr. Rickey's claim.

Mr. Rickey's physical and mental condition gradually improved and his claim progressed to
implementation of vocational services. His benefit entitlement changed from temporarily total
disability benefits, under RCW 51.32.090, to benefits during the vocational rehabilitation process,
under RCW 51.32.095. Prior to vocational rehabilitation, when an injured worker receives temporary
total disability, and an employer offers a light-duty job offer of disputed validity, the Department "shall
make a final determination pursuant to an order" as to such validity.\textsuperscript{6} However, Mr. Rickey's claim
was long past the light-duty job offer. On September 29, 2017, the Department found Mr. Rickey
eligible for vocational plan development. At the commencement of vocational rehabilitation services,
RCW 51.32.096 (previously RCW 51.32.099) governs benefit entitlement. The provisions of
RCW 51.32.096 are similar to those of RCW 51.32.090, but are not identical and do not require the
Department to issue an appealable order, separate from a closing order, as was done here with the
April 20, 2018 order on appeal. The facts and chronology here are consistent with our previous
decisions and Mr. Rickey is unemployable based on the vocational conclusion and decision at
vocational development. Therefore, Mr. Rickey is entitled to total disability compensation.

\textbf{Permanent/Temporary Aggravation:}

The parties dispute whether the steroid injection permanently or temporarily aggravated
Mr. Rickey's bipolar condition. We have encountered cases where an industrial injury only
temporarily aggravates a preexisting condition.\textsuperscript{7} In those cases, however, the condition is only
deemed aggravated when the condition has returned to the baseline, for example, pre-industrial injury
condition. Here, Mr. Rickey had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder; however, his
mental condition was stable at the time of the industrial injury without ongoing treatment or
medication, and he was able to complete full-time school and then work full-time without any evidence

\textsuperscript{4} In re Ruben Cuellar, BIIA Dec., 12 13134 (2013); In re Tesfai G. Ukbagergis, Dckt. No. 09 20737 (April 21, 2011); In re
Madison A. Curup, Dckt. No. 16 11021 (Feb. 6, 2017).
\textsuperscript{5} In re Tesfai G. Ukbagergis, Dckt. No. 09 20737 (April 21, 2011).
\textsuperscript{6} RCW 51.32.090(4)(l).
\textsuperscript{7} See, for example., In re Willetta A. Cody, Dckt. No. 00 12190 (April 22, 2002).
of mental disruption. And, as of claim closure, Dr. Hart, Dr. Johnson, Mr. Rickey, and Mr. Rickey’s father all testified as to his ongoing bipolar symptoms and difficulties.

We have previously held an industrial injury may cause a preexisting condition to become symptomatic, but the effects on the preexisting condition may be only temporary and not contribute to a further deterioration of the body part involved. Factually, it is proper to inquire whether the industrial injury continues to be a cause of a future need for treatment or a cause of further disability. It may be that the preexisting condition has progressed on its own, unrelated to the industrial injury. If that is the case, then the Department isn’t responsible for the worsening. Because Mr. Rickey’s condition has not returned to his pre-industrial injury condition, the evidence is insufficient to conclude the industrially related aggravation of Mr. Rickey’s preexisting bipolar disorder is only temporary.

DECISION

1. In Docket No. 18 13570, the claimant, Chancy T. Rickey, filed a protest with the Department of Labor and Industries on April 3, 2018. The Department forwarded it to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals as an appeal. Mr. Rickey appeals a February 6, 2018 Department order. In this order, the Department affirmed an October 25, 2017 order ending time-loss compensation as paid from October 11, 2017, through October 24, 2017. The order is reversed and remanded to the Department to pay time-loss compensation from October 25, 2017, through April 19, 2018.

2. In Docket No. 18 15264, Mr. Rickey filed a protest with the Department of Labor and Industries on May 24, 2018. The Department forwarded it to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals as an appeal. The claimant appeals an April 20, 2018 Department order. In this order, the Department affirmed its February 22, 2018 order that closed the claim with a permanent partial disability award consistent with Category 2 dorso-lumbar or lumbosacral impairments under WAC 296-20-280. The order is incorrect and is reversed and remanded to the Department with direction to find as of April 20, 2018, Mr. Rickey is a permanently totally disabled worker.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On June 21, 2018, an industrial appeals judge certified that the parties agreed to include the Jurisdictional History in the Board record solely for jurisdictional purposes.

2. On January 14, 2016, Chancy T. Rickey sustained an industrial injury while working for as a technician for Mechanical and Control Services when he slipped and fell onto his back. Mr. Rickey suffered an impingement of the S1 nerve root and S1 radiculopathy, a disc osteophyte.

---

8 In re Tae-Hee Kang, Dckt No. 11 18176 (November 15, 2012); In re Arlen Long, BIIA Dec., 94 2539 (1996).
complex, consisting of a herniated disc at L5, and a bone spur. His diagnosis included the aggravation of mental health conditions: bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder without agoraphobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, and attention deficit hyperactive disorder.

3. Mr. Rickey's conditions proximately caused by the January 14, 2016 industrial injury were fixed and stable as of April 20, 2018.

4. Mr. Rickey was born on March 16, 2017, and was 42 years old at the time of his hearing. He is married with two children. He graduated from high school, and obtained an Associate's degree and HVAC certificate. He has a varied employment history, including a pre-school teaching assistant, deli clerk, restaurant server, dishwasher, retail sales associate, pizza delivery driver, and HVAC technician.

5. Mr. Rickey's physical restrictions proximately caused by the industrial injury and its residuals included: 30 minutes of sitting up to four hours a day, 30 minutes of standing up to two hours a day, 20 minutes of walking up to two hours a day, and sitting, standing, or walking, alternatively, for up to eight hours a day. Standing or walking was restricted to 40 minutes at a time, up to four hours a day. For sitting, he required an ergonomic chair with lumbar support. He could work on ladders, climb ladders, and climb stairs, up to 10 percent of the workday. He could twist at the trunk, bend, stoop, kneel, squat, and crawl up to 20 feet for one to three hours a day, up to 13 percent of the workday. His ability to reach forward with both arms was unrestricted. He could reach from waist to shoulder, and work above the shoulders, up to six hours for a workday. He could constantly use a keyboard, bend his wrists, grasp forcefully, handle or grasp materials, and manipulate his fingers or hands. He could operate the foot controls on his left side up to three hours a day, on the right side up to six hours a day. Low impact vibration was unrestricted for his extremities. He could lift floor to waist: 30 pounds occasionally, 15 pounds frequently; waist to shoulder: 25 pounds occasionally, 12 pounds frequently; knee to waist: 30 pounds occasionally, and 15 pounds frequently. He could carry a 20 pound object a distance of 50 feet occasionally; push a 30 pound object a distance of 50 feet occasionally; and pull a 35 pound object a distance of 50 feet occasionally.

6. Mr. Rickey was temporarily totally disabled and unable to perform or obtain gainful employment on a reasonably continuous basis from October 25, 2017, through April 19, 2018.

7. Mr. Rickey's condition diagnosed as Bipolar Disorder Type 1 was permanently aggravated by the industrial injury, following a steroid injection in April 2016.

8. As of April 20, 2018, Mr. Rickey had a permanent partial disability proximately caused by the industrial injury equal to Category 2 for dorso
lumbar/lumbosacral impairments under WAC 296-20-280 and Category 3 for mental health conditions under WAC 296-20-340.

9. Mr. Rickey was unable to perform or obtain gainful employment on a reasonably continuous basis from October 25, 2017, through April 19, 2018, and as of April 20, 2018, due to the residuals of the industrial injury and taking into account his age, education, work history, and preexisting conditions.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter in these appeals.

2. Mr. Rickey's industrially related conditions were fixed and stable as of April 20, 2018.

3. Chancy T. Rickey was a temporarily totally disabled worker within the meaning of RCW 51.32.090 from October 25, 2017, through April 19, 2018.

4. Mr. Rickey was a permanently totally disabled worker within the meaning of RCW 51.08.160, as of April 20, 2018.

5. The Department orders dated February 6, 2018, and April 20, 2018, are incorrect and reversed. This matter is remanded to the Department to pay time-loss compensation benefits from October 25, 2017, through April 19, 2018, and to find Chancy T. Rickey permanently totally disabled as of April 20, 2018.

Dated: December 27, 2019.

BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS

LINDA L. WILLIAMS, Chairperson

ISABEL A. M. COLE, Member

DISSENT

I disagree with the majority's decision to award a pension in a case where the Department has not yet issued a final vocational order. Because the majority's decision departs from the purpose and goals of the vocational rehabilitation statutes, I dissent. The issue that the majority should address is the procedural obligations of the Department when it halts vocational retraining and temporary total
disability benefits based on the incorrect assumption that a valid job was offered to a worker. The matter should be remanded to the Department to consider the dispute and issue an appealable order.

The majority notes that the statute regarding vocational rehabilitation, RCW 51.32.096, does not require the same procedure after a finding of an invalid job offer as does RCW 51.32.090. The latter requires the Department make a determination and issue an order regarding the validity of the job offer. What is overlooked is that the vocational rehabilitation statute is completely silent as to what follows a worker’s assertion that the job offer is not valid. Should the Department make a separate determination of the validity of the job offer as required by RCW 51.32.090 or may the Department remove the propriety of vocational retraining for consideration by simply closing the claim? I would determine that once the worker’s asserts the job offer is not valid, the Department must issue an order as contemplated not only by RCW 51.32.090, but also by application of RCW 51.52.050 and its responsibility to resolve the issue with an appealable order.

By not insisting the Department use this procedure, as the majority concludes, continued vocational retraining is removed from consideration and employability must be determined without the benefit of retraining. Because RCW 51.32.096 is silent on the procedure to be used in such a dispute we should rely on and require it to invoke the procedure created for similar situations under RCW 51.32.090. The goal of returning injured workers to employability is usurped by allowing the Department to close the claim without resolving the issue using required administrative and appellate procedures.

Unfortunately that was not done here, and rather than rely on the stale proposition that we cannot reverse a closing order for vocational purposes, we should anticipate what would have happened at the Department level if the Department had complied with the requirements of RCW 51.32.090. I doubt that the Department would determine that it could not reinstate vocational retraining. Yet that is exactly the result here. The majority, although concluding the job offer was not valid, declines to either remand for the Department to consider what should be done if the job offer is invalid or to reinstate vocational retraining.

At the time the employer offered Mr. Rickey a light-duty job, his disability was temporary. RCW 51.32.090 governs a temporarily totally disabled worker’s return to available work. The statute details the Legislature’s preference towards facilitating an injured worker’s return to, or remain at, work.

---

9 See In re Ryan Lowry, BIIA Dec., 91 C061 (1991) (When a dispute arises during the administration of the claim, the Department should issue an appealable order.)
following their injury. Per the statute governing temporary total disability and return to work offers, RCW 51.32.090(4)(l):

In the event of any dispute as to the validity of the work offered or as to the worker’s ability to perform the available work offered by the employer, the department shall make the final determination pursuant to an order that contains the notice required by RCW 51.52.060 and that is subject to appeal subject to RCW 51.52.050.

The appealable order requirement is essential as it avoids the unfortunate result arrived at by the majority. It is also consistent with our holding in In re Albina M. Pascual,¹⁰ in which we remanded the closing order for required further litigation regarding vocational services.

The majority relies on a line of decisions that indicate that the Department runs the risk of closing the claim if there are unresolved vocational issues. These cases are not relevant to the situation here where vocational retraining was authorized at the exercise of the Director’s discretion, but terminated on a factually incorrect basis. The statute allows retraining to be cancelled after a valid job offer; it does not provide cancellation if the job offer is determined to be invalid. By concluding the Department should have issued a separate order on the validity of the job offer, we would not be overstepping the Director’s discretion to determine if vocational services are warranted. That determination had already been made when services were terminated based on what was subsequently concluded an invalid job offer.

One of the primary purposes of the Industrial Insurance Act is to lessen disability and return the injured worker to employment. In the circumstance when a determination is made that a job offer is invalid, as the majority determined here, the appropriate resolution of the claim, consistent with the purpose and goals of our workers’ compensation system, requires remand to the Department to adjudicate Mr. Rickey’s entitlement to vocational services prior to a final decision being made on employability.

December 27, 2019.

JACK S. ENG

BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS

¹⁰ Dckt. No. 09 20949 (July 22, 2010).
Addendum to Decision and Order  
In re Chancy T. Rickey  
Docket Nos. 18 13570 & 18 15264  
Claim No. BA-08508

Appearances  
Claimant, Chancy T. Rickey, by Davies Pearson, P.C., per Benjamin R. Sligar  
Employer, Mechanical & Control Services, by Law Office of Robert M. Arim PLLC, per Robert M. Arim  
Retrospective Rating Group, Associated Builders & Contractors #00237 (did not appear)  
Department of Labor and Industries, by Office of the Attorney General, per Lynette Weatherby-Teague

Petition for Review  
As provided by RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review and decision. The claimant filed a timely Petition for Review of a Proposed Decision and Order issued on July 2, 2019, in which the industrial appeals judge affirmed the Department order dated February 6, 2018, and reversed and remanded the Department order dated April 20, 2018.

Evidentiary Rulings  
The Board has reviewed the evidentiary rulings in the record of proceedings and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are affirmed. The Proposed Decision and Order lists Exhibit No. 4 as rejected and Exhibit Nos. 5 through 10 as not offered. However, Exhibit Nos. 4 through 10 are duplicates of the admitted exhibits and as such are removed from the record.