

# State Roofing & Insulation

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## ASSESSMENTS

### Piece Work

In an assessment appeal, the Board found equitable estoppel where the employer relied to its detriment on Department representations and past practices on determinations of average rate of compensation for piece workers and where the employer would suffer if the Department were allowed to repudiate or contradict its prior acts, practices, and policies. ....***In re State Roofing & Insulation, BIIA Dec., 89 1770 (1991)*** [*Editor's Note: The Board's decision was appealed to superior court under Snohomish County Cause No. 91-2-01375-4.*]

## BOARD

### Equitable powers

Because the courts have applied equitable estoppel against the state, if there is no question or doubt as to the extent of the Board's jurisdiction in a particular case, the Board may apply the doctrine under the principle of stare decisis in the same manner as it applies other principles of law. Estoppel will apply in proper circumstances against the Department, in its role as a taxing agency, and reliance, if reasonable, may be placed upon both the silence and non-action of the state where it ought to speak, as well as upon affirmative statements and actions. ....***In re State Roofing & Insulation, BIIA Dec., 89 1770 (1991)*** [*Editor's Note: The Board's decision was appealed to superior court under Snohomish County Cause No. 91-2-01375-4. The Board has refined its interpretation of applying equity under stare decisis to explain that cases with similar facts are precedent and need not involve nearly identical facts in order to allow the Board to reach an equitable decision. In so doing the Board is not creating an equitable remedy, but following precedent. In re Lyle Applegate, BIIA Dec., 18 16730 (2019).*]

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**BEFORE THE BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS  
STATE OF WASHINGTON**

1   **IN RE: STATE ROOFING &**                                    )  
2   **INSULATION, INC.**    )  
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4   **FIRM NO. 372,995-00**                                    )  
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**APPEARANCES:**

Firm-petitioner, State Roofing & Insulation, Inc., by  
Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis & Holman, per  
Charles R. Bush

Department of Labor and Industries, by  
The Attorney General, per  
Christa L. Thompson, Christine A. Tilton, Timothy A. Brewer and  
Maureen Mannix, Assistants and  
Yvonne Dickson, Paralegal

This is an appeal filed by the employer, State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. on May 4, 1989 from an Order and Notice Reconsidering Notice and Order of Assessment of the Department of Labor and Industries dated April 20, 1989 which affirmed a Notice and Order of Assessment of Industrial Insurance Taxes No. 67064 dated December 30, 1988 which assessed industrial insurance taxes against the employer in the amount of \$122,731.74 for the period from July 1, 1986 through June 30, 1988. **REVERSED AND REMANDED.**

**DECISION**

Pursuant to RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review and decision on a timely Petition for Review filed by the employer, State Roofing & Insulation, Inc., to a Proposed Decision and Order issued on July 23, 1990 in which the Department Order and Notice Reconsidering Notice and Order of Assessment dated April 20, 1989 was affirmed.

The Board has reviewed the evidentiary rulings in the record of proceedings and finds that no prejudicial error was committed and said rulings are hereby affirmed.

The employer, State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. (State Roofing), argues the Department should be equitably estopped from collecting a portion of industrial insurance taxes assessed for a two year period, the third quarter of 1986 through the second quarter of 1988. Our Industrial Appeals Judge held this Board lacks the authority to grant State Roofing the equitable relief requested, and affirmed the Department's actions. We hold the Board does have authority to grant equitable relief of the type

1 sought by State Roofing and that the Department is estopped from assessing and collecting a portion  
2 of the taxes assessed for the period in question.  
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4 Lance Smith and his brother, Brad Smith, bought the business then known as State Roofers as  
5 50/50 partners from their uncle in 1976. The business has grown, is now incorporated and specializes  
6 primarily in residential shake roofing application, although the firm also performs commercial-type  
7 roofing and applies residential roofs of varying materials. The firm purchased a shake mill in 1979  
8 which produces shakes strictly for its own use. The firm focuses on the portion of the east Puget  
9 Sound area circumscribed by Marysville on the north and Federal Way on the south.  
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11 The "piece workers" rule <sup>1</sup> is used to calculate the worker hours upon which State Roofing pays  
12 industrial insurance premiums for a substantial number of its workers. Certain roofers within  
13 classification 0507 are compensated by the square, in other words based upon the number of shake  
14 bundles installed, five bundles equaling 100 square feet. Likewise, certain shake mill workers within  
15 classification 1005 are compensated based upon the number of bundles of shakes produced. The  
16 hours attributable to a particular piece worker are calculated by dividing the worker's compensation by  
17 the "average rate of compensation for the applicable classification" rounded down to the nearest half  
18 dollar, based upon "records of the department as compiled for the preceding fiscal year." WAC  
19 296-17-350(6). Under this rule, it can readily be seen that hours upon which an employer must pay  
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27 <sup>1</sup>WAC 296-17-350 reads in relevant part:F  
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29 (6) Piece workers. For employees whose compensation is based  
30 upon the accomplishment of a number of individual tasks whether  
31 computed on the number of pounds, items, pieces, or otherwise who  
32 are not subject to any federal or state law or rule which requires the  
33 reporting of actual hours worked, the employer shall for purpose of  
34 premium calculation assume each two dollars of earnings of each  
35 employee as representing one worker hour: Provided, That if the  
36 average rate of compensation for the applicable classification is at  
37 least \$3.00 but less than \$3.50 per worker hour the assumed  
38 amount shall be \$3.00 of earnings as representing one worker hour,  
39 and on a progressive basis, if the average compensation is at least  
40 \$3.50 but less than \$4.00 the assumed amount shall be \$3.50 of  
41 earnings as representing one worker hour, and so forth. The records  
42 of the department as compiled for the preceding fiscal year ending  
43 June 30, shall be the basis for determining the average rate of  
44 compensation for each classification: . . .  
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46 WAC 296-17-350(6).  
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1 taxes vary inversely with the average rate of compensation; a lower rate of compensation produces a  
2 larger number of hours and a higher rate of compensation produces a lower number of hours upon  
3 which premiums will be paid.  
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5 State Roofing has used \$19.50 as the average rate of compensation amount by which its piece  
6 workers' gross compensation is divided, in both the roof work 0507 classification and in the shake mill  
7 1005 classification. During the audit period, the third quarter of 1986 through the second quarter of  
8 1988, the applicable average rates of compensation as determined by the Department were: for roof  
9 work classification 0507, \$18.50 in 1986, \$13.50 in 1987, and \$14.00 in 1988; and, for shake mill  
10 classification 1005 \$11.50 in 1986, \$12.00 in 1987, and \$12.00 in 1988. State Roofing paid  
11 \$488,934.59 in industrial insurance taxes during the two-year period subject to the audit. The  
12 discrepancy between the higher divisor used by State Roofing and the lower divisor used by the  
13 Department in the piece workers rule formula accounts for the lion's share of the additional  
14 \$122,731.48 which the Department assessed as further due in taxes for the two-year period.  
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16 State Roofing asks that we hold the Department is barred under principles of equitable estoppel  
17 from collecting the additional assessments related to the piece worker calculations. We view the  
18 following facts as relevant to that determination. The average rate of compensation amount used by  
19 the prior owner for calculations under the piece worker rule was \$19.50. The present owners of State  
20 Roofing employed that same amount as the divisor in their own piece workers rule calculations without  
21 interruption through the second quarter of 1988. In 1983 the Department conducted an audit of State  
22 Roofing which covered the period of the first quarter of 1981 through the fourth quarter of 1982.  
23 Exhibit No. 3. That audit report did not criticize State Roofing's use of \$19.50 as the average rate of  
24 compensation under the piece workers rule for roof workers or for mill workers, nor did the audit staff  
25 orally criticize the employer for using that rate.  
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27 Lance Smith testified that he was aware that the average rate of compensation might change  
28 from time to time over the years. However, he did not direct any change in State Roofing's use of the  
29 \$19.50 divisor over these years. He explained his belief that from 1983 to 1989 the compensation  
30 paid in the industry to both mill workers and roof workers has never decreased and, in fact, has  
31 generally increased. Mr. Smith also explained that over the years State Roofing has bid on public  
32 works contracts. In order to prepare each bid, he has called the Department's Employment  
33 Standards-Apprenticeship-Crime Victims Division (ESAC) to obtain the prevailing wage rate required  
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1 for such contracts. Although admittedly not able to recall the exact figures, Mr. Smith recalled that the  
2 figure provided by ESAC was "always very close" to the \$19.50 figure. 3/7/90 Tr. at 43.  
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4 In his approximately 18 years in the roofing industry, Mr. Smith has not been aware of a division  
5 within the Department other than ESAC from which he could obtain wage rate information. Mr. Smith  
6 stated that he has never seen any notice from the Department, formal or informal, either specifically  
7 directed to State Roofing or to the industry in general, relating to the average rate of compensation  
8 which the Department expects to be used in piece workers rule calculations. Mr. Smith stated that he  
9 would have directed a change in the calculations accordingly, had he been apprised of a change in the  
10 average rate of compensation. He further noted that he has since learned that the divisor for the  
11 roofing classification increased in 1984 to \$21.00, which would have resulted in lesser industrial  
12 insurance taxes related to that classification had the appropriate divisor been used.  
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18 Nancy Smith has been the bookkeeper and office manager for State Roofing since 1978. She  
19 prepared Department of Labor and Industries quarterly reports until 1981, when A.D.T. began  
20 preparing the reports as part of its payroll service to the firm. The quarterly reports are now prepared  
21 by payroll staff at State Roofing. In any event, even when A.D.T. was preparing payroll and quarterly  
22 reports, the piece workers rule calculations were made by Mrs. Smith or other State Roofing staff on  
23 respective workers' time cards, which contained the gross pay information. In this regard, we note that  
24 the 1983 Post-Audit Instructions (Auditor's Comments Sheet) affirmatively indicated to State Roofing  
25 that its records were "OK" in the areas of "Availability", "Completeness" and "Accuracy", since the  
26 auditor checked the box under "OK" as opposed to "Deficiency". Exhibit No. 3, p. 4.  
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31 Mrs. Smith also described the information which State Roofing received from the Department  
32 by way of regular quarterly reports. Although substantial information regarding premium rates and  
33 proper classifications was provided by these Department reports, no information was supplied to State  
34 Roofing regarding the appropriate average rate of compensation to be used under the piece workers  
35 rule. This was confirmed by the Department's field auditor, Patrick E. deVries.  
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39 State Roofing also called as its witnesses two Department employees: Miriam Moses, an  
40 industrial statistician with the Prevailing Wage Section of the ESAC Division; and, Gary Griesmeyer, a  
41 research analyst who works with the actuarial staff in the Industrial Insurance Division in the setting of  
42 industrial insurance premium (tax) rates. We have learned the following from their testimony, as well  
43 as the later testimony of field auditor Patrick deVries. None of the Department's employees could  
44 identify any statute or adopted rule or regulation other than WAC 296-17-350(6) which would direct an  
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1 employer to the particular division of the Department or other source to find out the amount to be used  
2 as the average rate of compensation for particular classifications under the piece workers rule. Mr.  
3 DeVries indicated that the Department sends out employer bulletins on a quarterly basis and stated  
4 that bulletins in 1984 and in 1986 specifically addressed the piece workers rule: "That notice for  
5 piecework is noted here and where they should contact the Department, or that they should contact  
6 the Department on a yearly basis to be notified of the new rate." 3/7/90 Tr. at 73. Mr. deVries  
7 described the bulletin as a folded newsletter on colored paper approximately four pages long. He did  
8 not know whether the newsletter was mailed in an envelope nor whether it was mailed to individual  
9 employers.

10 The Department's Industrial Insurance Division in 1986 altered the source from which it  
11 obtained the "average rate of compensation" to be used in the piece workers rule calculations, at least  
12 with regard to the roof worker classification 0507. Until 1986, the Industrial Insurance Division utilized  
13 the prevailing wage rate figure promulgated by the ESAC Division as the minimum wage which must  
14 be paid on a public works project. When asked her opinion as to "whether the prevailing wage would  
15 be generally on the high side or the low side of the actual average hourly wage", Ms. Moses indicated  
16 "(i)t would be on the high side." 3/7/90 Tr. at 13. In 1986, the Industrial Insurance Division began  
17 establishing its own average rate of compensation amount from its own records by dividing gross  
18 compensation reported by total hours reported in a particular classification by employers. This  
19 provided a lower figure than that previously obtained from the ESAC Division. In 1986, the Industrial  
20 Insurance Division used an average between the two sources and, then, beginning in 1987 went  
21 solely with its own calculations. The results of this change are readily observable by tracking the  
22 average rate of compensation amount utilized by the Department from 1983 forward: 1983--\$19.50;  
23 1984--\$21.00; 1985--\$21.00; 1986--\$18.50; 1987--\$13.50; and 1988--\$14.00. Although not directly  
24 stated, we believe the inference from the testimony is inescapable that the Industrial Insurance  
25 Division changed its source for an "average rate of compensation" precisely due to the belief that the  
26 ESAC Division source was on the "high end" and also with knowledge that the resulting average rate  
27 of compensation used would be significantly lower under the new method.<sup>2</sup> Had the Department

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<sup>2</sup>According to Ms. Moses, the ESAC "prevailing wage rate" equals the "wage rate, plus  
benefits, should benefits apply." 3/7/90 Tr. at 7. During the period of 1980 through 1989, the wages  
never decreased except for an update occurring on July 15, 1988 when the wage figure was  
\$18.35 as compared to an update occurring December 1, 1986 when the wage rate was \$18.85.  
However, we note that the benefit portion increased between these two dates from \$2.57 to

1 continued to use the ESAC Division figures, the average rate of compensation would have stayed the  
2 same or increased as Mr. Smith believed.  
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4 Finally, there is a significant difference in the facts of this case related to the shake mill  
5 classification 1005 as distinguished from the roof work classification 0507. Unlike the roof work  
6 classification, the proper "average rate of compensation" for the shake mill classification was never  
7 \$19.50 as far as we are aware. We are not apprised of any change in Department procedures  
8 regarding this classification, such as from using the ESAC Division prevailing wage figure to using an  
9 "average rate of compensation" calculated by the Industrial Insurance Division from its own records.  
10 The "average rate of compensation" amounts used by the Department in the shake mill classification  
11 are: 1983 - \$12.00; 1984 - \$11.50; 1985 - \$10.50; 1986 - \$11.50; 1987 - \$12.00; and 1988 - \$12.00.  
12 There are no marked fluctuations of the amount used under this classification. We infer from this and  
13 the other information provided, that when Mr. Smith called the Department's ESAC Division, he was  
14 only requesting information concerning the prevailing wage rate for the roof worker classification 0507  
15 and not for the shake mill classification 1005. Consistent with this, we assume a prevailing wage rate  
16 for shake mill workers was not relevant to public works contracts upon which State Roofing bid. In  
17 short, the evidence before us does not suggest any other reasons for State Roofing's belief that  
18 \$19.50 might be the appropriate "average rate of compensation" for shake mill workers in classification  
19 1005 other than the \$19.50 rate having been utilized historically by State Roofing without criticism by  
20 the Department in its 1983 audit or subsequently, prior to the 1988 audit with which we are now  
21 concerned.  
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23 We next turn our attention to the matter of this Board's authority to apply principles of equitable  
24 estoppel and, then, to whether the doctrine is applicable in the present case.  
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#### 26 **BOARD AUTHORITY TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL**

27 We have previously refused to apply equitable doctrines in In re Isaias Chavez, Dec'd., BIIA  
28 Dec., 85 2867 (1987); In re Ronald E. Jamieson, BIIA Dec., 62,551 (1983); and In re Seth E. Jackson,  
29 BIIA Dec., 61,088 (1982). In each of these cases we declared that we lack broad equitable powers.  
30 In each we considered that granting the equitable relief requested would require that we extend the  
31 extent of our jurisdiction and/or that we expand an equitable doctrine beyond the confines of its reach  
32 as determined by our courts.  
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\$3.15. Thus the increase in benefits applicable to July 15, 1988 more than offset the decrease in  
the wage portion. The total "prevailing wage rate" actually increased.

1 We have repeatedly indicated, however, that this Board lacks any broad  
2 equitable powers . . . . The Board applies the law as established by cases  
3 such as [Rodriguez v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 85 Wn.2d 949, 540 P.2d  
4 1359 (1975) and Ames v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 176 Wash. 509, 30  
5 P.2d 239 (1934) ], not because it holds any equitable power but because  
6 it is anticipating the relief which would be granted under the principle of  
7 stare decisis upon further appeal to superior court. It is without authority  
8 to expand those doctrines to cases presenting dissimilar facts. Jamieson,  
9 supra, at 5. No authority has been brought to our attention which would  
10 allow us to find that ignorance of the law or illiteracy constitute sufficient  
11 excuses for not filing a timely claim as required by RCW 51.28.050.  
12 Under these circumstances and for the aforementioned reasons we are  
13 unable to extend the principles of Rodriguez and Ames to the facts of this  
14 case.

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16 In re Isaias Chavez, Dec'd., supra, at 9.

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18 We have cited State ex rel Pioli v. Higher Education Board, 16 Wn. App. 642, 558 P.2d 1364  
19 (1976) and Tacoma v. Civil Serv. Bd. of Tacoma, 6 Wn.App. 600, 494 P.2d 1380 (1972) when refusing  
20 to exercise equitable power. See, e.g., Jamieson, supra, at 5 and Jackson, supra, at 3. Each of these  
21 cases which we have previously cited also related to the question of whether the tribunal had  
22 jurisdiction over the party or the subject matter of the dispute. The court held that the administrative  
23 tribunal could not expand its jurisdiction by equity:

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25 More important to disposal of this contention is that the Higher Education  
26 Personnel Board's jurisdiction is determined by statute, not equity. See  
27 Tacoma v. Civil Serv. Bd., supra. Estoppel cannot be used for the  
28 purpose of conferring subject matter jurisdiction upon a court. Wesley v.  
29 Schneckloth, 55 Wn.2d 90, 346 P.2d 658 (1959); Rust v. Western  
30 Washington State College, 11 Wn.App. 410, 523 P.2d 204 (1974). We  
31 hold estoppel cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on an  
32 administrative tribunal which has a more restricted scope of authority.  
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36 State v. Higher Educ. Personnel Bd., 16 Wn.App. at 646. See also Jones v. Dep't of Corrections, 46  
37 Wn.App. 275, 279, 730 P.2d 112 (1986).

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39 There is no question or doubt as to the extent of our jurisdiction in the present case. Rather,  
40 the substantive issue is whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied against the  
41 Department, given the facts we have described. We may apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel  
42 under the principle of stare decisis just as we apply other principles of law. In re Isaias Chavez, Dec'd.,  
43 supra, at 9. Since our courts have found that equitable estoppel is applicable against the State, we  
44 may apply the doctrine where the circumstances are appropriate and within those situations and  
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1 guidelines set out by our courts. See Shafer v. State of Washington, 83 Wn.2d 618, 622, 521 P.2d  
2 736 (1974) and Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wn.2d 161, 171, 443 P.2d 833 (1968).

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4 **APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE**  
5 **ESTOPPEL TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE**

6 Estoppel consists of three elements: (1) an admission, statement, or act  
7 inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) action by the other party on  
8 the faith of such admission, statement, or act; and (3) injury to such  
9 other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate  
10 such admission, statement, or act. Harbor Air Serv., Inc. v. Board of Tax  
11 Appeals, 88 Wn.2d 359, 366-67, 560 P.2d 1145 (1977). The State can be  
12 estopped where a party has acted to his or her detriment in reliance upon  
13 the State's commitment, although the State cannot be estopped because  
14 of unauthorized admissions, conduct, or acts of its officers. Estoppel will  
15 not lightly be invoked against the State to deprive it of the power to collect  
16 taxes.  
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19 Revenue v. Martin Air Conditioning, 35 Wn.App. 678, 682-683, 668 P.2d 1286 (1983).

20 The court in Martin Air Conditioning cited, as an example of the principles we have just quoted,  
21 Kitsap-Mason Dairymen's Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 77 Wn.2d 812, 467 P.2d 312 (1970) in which  
22 the court distinguished a taxing agency oversight from a change in interpretation of a statute or rule.  
23 In that case the court noted:  
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26 This is not a case in which auditors changed their interpretation of a  
27 statute or rule. It is one in which they overlooked through ignorance,  
28 neglect or inadvertence Kitsap's error in computing the tax. The fact that  
29 the oversight only recently has been discovered does not relieve Kitsap of  
30 its liability for the correct tax during the audit period now under  
31 consideration.  
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33 The doctrine of estoppel will not be lightly invoked against the state to  
34 deprive it of the power to collect taxes. The state cannot be estopped by  
35 unauthorized acts, admissions or conduct of its officers. Wasem's Inc. v.  
36 State, 63 Wn.2d 67, 385 P.2d 530 (1963); Bennett v. Grays Harbor  
37 County, 15 Wn.2d 331, 130 P.2d 1041 (1942).  
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39 Kitsap-Mason Dairymen's Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 77 Wn.2d at 818 (Emphasis supplied).  
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41 Applying the rules from these cases, the court in Martin Air Conditioning found that the  
42 Department of Revenue was not estopped from collecting sales taxes on fuel pump-outs or  
43 assumptions even though Martin Air Conditioning's practice of refunding the sales tax to the old  
44 customer and taking a deduction had been undetected for several years. The court found that the  
45 Department of Revenue did not change its policy with respect to application of the particular  
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1 Washington Administrative Code provisions which it had promulgated and that Martin Air Conditioning  
2 had not in fact relied upon any past interpretations, audit reports or instructions from the Department of  
3 Revenue. The evidence presented

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5 ... a pattern of erroneous reporting done in good faith which went  
6 undetected because of mistake or inadvertence on the part of state  
7 auditors in failing to catch the error after reviewing the books, or because it  
8 was not discoverable from the books. It does not suggest an act,  
9 admission, or statement inconsistent with a claim later asserted, on the  
10 faith of which another acts. This is not a situation which is proper for the  
11 application of the doctrine of estoppel.  
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13 Martin Air Conditioning, 35 Wn.App. at 687-688.

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15 We glean from these cases the principle that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should not  
16 apply against the taxing agency where reliance is asserted to have been only upon inadvertent  
17 oversight or mistake by agency auditors in a prior audit, regardless of whether the error leading to the  
18 erroneous reporting by the taxpayer was observable in prior audits.  
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21 In the present case, State Roofing was utilizing \$19.50 as the average rate of compensation  
22 under the piece workers rule for both its shake mill workers and roof workers during the 1983 audit  
23 period. The Department's auditors overlooked this during the 1983 audit. It appears that State  
24 Roofing's error was discoverable had the auditors viewed the time cards on which the piece worker  
25 rule calculations were made by State Roofing's bookkeeper. With regard to the shake mill  
26 classification, State Roofing has not suggested anything other than asserted reliance upon the  
27 Department's oversight in the 1983 audit. State Roofing had apparently erroneously assumed that it  
28 could use the \$19.50 divisor for this classification upon purchase of the shake mill in 1979.  
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31 Apart from the 1983 audit oversight, there has been no showing that the Department in any  
32 way induced State Roofing to use this figure in the shake mill classification. No evidence was  
33 presented to show that the Industrial Insurance Division was using the ESAC Division prevailing wage  
34 rate in this classification at any time, let alone that the Industrial Insurance Division changed any  
35 practice in this regard. We have already inferred from this that Mr. Smith's inquiries of the ESAC  
36 Division subsequent to 1983 concerned the prevailing wage rate in the roof workers classification and  
37 not in the shake mill classification. A finding that State Roofing somehow relied upon these  
38 communications as a basis for its continued use of the \$19.50 figure in the shake mill classification  
39 would amount to sheer speculation. "Estoppels must be certain to every intent, and are not to be  
40 taken as sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference." P.U.D. v. Cooper, 69 Wn.2d 909, 918,  
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1 421 P.2d 1002 (1966). See also Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 102 Wn.2d 874, 905, 691 P.2d 524  
2 (1984) and Pioneer National Title v. State, 39 Wn.App. 758, 760-761, 695 P.2d 996 (1985). We  
3 conclude that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply against the Department to prevent its  
4 collection of the increased premiums attributable to recalculation utilizing the correct average rate of  
5 compensation for piece workers in the shake mill classification.  
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9 However, with regard to the roof worker classification, the decisions of our courts applying the  
10 doctrine of equitable estoppel direct that an opposite result should adhere. Equitable estoppel may be  
11 applied against the state when acting in its governmental as well as in its proprietary capacity "when  
12 necessary to prevent a manifest injustice and the exercise of its governmental powers will not be  
13 impaired thereby." Finch v. Matthews, supra, 74 Wn.2d at 175.  
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16 In Harbor Air v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 88 Wn.2d 359, 560 P.2d 1145 (1977) the court found in  
17 favor of the taxpayer, Harbor Air, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Harbor Air agreed to  
18 purchase a flight service business, complied with Washington's Uniform Commercial Code -Bulk  
19 Transfers Article, included the Department of Revenue as a creditor and gave notice to the  
20 Department of Revenue. The Department of Revenue responded that it was unable to locate excise  
21 tax returns of the purchased business from January 1, 1972 forward and that an audit was  
22 outstanding. Prior to closing on the deal, the business which Harbor Air was purchasing filed tax  
23 returns for the periods after January 1, 1972. Subsequent communications from the Department of  
24 Revenue gave no indication that there were any anticipated tax deficiencies prior to January 1, 1972  
25 or that the audit would encompass earlier periods. After Harbor Air closed the deal for the agreed  
26 purchase price, the Department of Revenue enlarged its audit and sought to collect taxes owing for  
27 periods prior to January 1, 1972. The court found that the Department of Revenue could have easily  
28 clarified the scope of its audits and prevented Harbor Air's misunderstanding and that Harbor Air would  
29 not have disbursed the purchase funds if it had known the scope of the audit. "Permitting the  
30 department to collect Executive's [the purchased business] taxes from respondent would result in  
31 manifest injustice to respondent and should not be allowed." Harbor Air, 88 Wn.2d at 367.  
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40 The Supreme Court later characterized its holding in Harbor Air as follows: "State estopped  
41 because it created a predictable misunderstanding by its ambiguous communication." Board of  
42 Regents v. Seattle, 108 Wn.2d 545, 553, 741 P.2d 11 (1987).  
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45 The court in Board of Regents also cited with approval Conversions v. Dep't of Revenue, 11  
46 Wn.App. 127, 521 P.2d 1203 (1974). "The State will be estopped by its silence, coupled with  
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1 knowledge of another's detrimental acts in reliance on that silence. Thus, the State's advice that a  
2 non-collection taxation hearing is pending coupled with 10 years of subsequent inaction estops the  
3 State from later collecting taxes; the taxpayer justifiably assumed that the State's silence implicated a  
4 non- collection ruling ..." Board of Regents, supra, 108 Wn.2d at 553. In Conversions, the court  
5 returned the case for trial, outlining the requirements for a showing that equitable estoppel should  
6 apply against the Department of Revenue: " (1) that the state has previously acted (non-acted) in a  
7 manner inconsistent with the claim which it presently asserts; (2) the taxpayer had a right to, and  
8 reasonably did, rely on the state's non-action; and (3) the taxpayer has been injured by reason  
9 thereof". Conversions, supra, 11 Wn.App. at 135.

10 From these cases we conclude not only that estoppel will apply in the proper circumstances  
11 against a state taxing agency, but also that reliance, if reasonable, may be placed upon both the  
12 silence and non- action of the state where it ought to speak or act to prevent the misunderstanding, as  
13 well as upon affirmative statements and actions. Board of Regents v. Seattle, supra, 108 Wn.2d at  
14 553-554; Harbor Air v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, supra, 88 Wn.2d at 366-67; and Conversions v. Dep't of  
15 Revenue, supra, 11 Wn.App. at 135. With regard to piece worker rule calculations for the roof workers  
16 classification 0507, State Roofing has shown that it reasonably relied to its detriment upon affirmative  
17 acts and statements, as well as silence and non-action on the part of the Department, which were  
18 inconsistent with the Department's recalculations under the piece worker rule for the audit period now  
19 under consideration. We do not rely upon the Department's oversight in the 1983 audit.

20 The Department agrees that the \$19.50 figure used by State Roofing in its calculations for the  
21 roof workers classification was indeed correct in 1983. The Department also admits that, as Mr. Smith  
22 assumed, that figure was derived from the Department's ESAC Division's determination of the  
23 prevailing wage rate. Upon contacting the Department in subsequent years, Mr. Smith found that the  
24 prevailing wage rate remained close to the \$19.50 figure, if anything increasing but never decreasing.  
25 The Department's own staff verified that this was in fact true.

26 In reliance upon this knowledge, Mr. Smith did not initiate any change in calculation of his piece  
27 workers' hours in the roof work classification. Given that WAC 296-17-350(6) calls for rounding the  
28 average rate of compensation off to the lowest half-dollar, we believe it reasonable that Mr. Smith  
29 chose not to explore further the possibility that State Roofing's industrial insurance tax liability might  
30 have actually been less for certain periods. In any event, the Department does not here complain that  
31 State Roofing paid too much tax for the roof worker classification during any period.

1 Both Mr. Smith and bookkeeper Nancy Smith testified that they did not receive any  
2 communication from the Department which called their attention to a change in the average rate of  
3 compensation figure to be used for the roof worker classification or which would alert them to the need  
4 to make any further inquiry of the Department than that already being accomplished by Mr. Smith's  
5 contacts with the ESAC Division. The Department has not criticized the extent of State Roofing's  
6 record keeping nor the regular flow of quarterly reports between State Roofing and the Department.  
7 None of these communications contained any information which would have alerted State Roofing to  
8 its error. We also note that there has been no suggestion that State Roofing was attempting to avoid  
9 its full liability for industrial insurance premiums.

10 During the audit period in question, State Roofing paid \$488,934.59 in industrial insurance  
11 taxes. It was only after the Department's subsequent audit that State Roofing learned of its error.  
12 Although detailed evidence was not presented on the matter of injury or detriment which State Roofing  
13 would suffer from additional taxes, Mr. Smith clearly testified that the roofing business is highly  
14 competitive. The obvious inference must follow that, having completed State Roofing's contracts  
15 during the audit period, the expense of additional taxes for that period cannot readily be passed on to  
16 future customers. Detailed information on this point is wholly unnecessary to clearly convince us that  
17 State Roofing would be financially injured by the Department's actions.

18 We have already indicated that we do not, and could not under the law, rely upon a mere  
19 oversight by Department auditors in the 1983 audit. The Department has advanced only two other  
20 reasons why it believes equitable estoppel should not adhere related to piece worker calculations in  
21 the roof worker classification. Neither of these reasons has merit upon close examination.

22 First, the Department presented some testimony to the effect that information regarding the  
23 proper average rate of compensation, or the source for obtaining this information, was made available  
24 by way of employer bulletins. We cannot give any weight to this contention in the present case  
25 because the Department's only witness did not have any knowledge as to whether such bulletins were  
26 mailed to State Roofing. In addition, the record before us provides little further information other than  
27 that the bulletins take the form of newsletters. The Department has not suggested that any authority  
28 exists, legal or otherwise, to support the proposition that State Roofing should reasonably be held  
29 responsible for reviewing the bulletins if it indeed received them. The fact that such bulletins existed,  
30 or that other employers made use of information contained in them, does not significantly detract from  
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1 the reliance by State Roofing upon the pattern of more affirmative representations and actions on the  
2 part of the Department.  
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4 Secondly, the Department argues that the language of WAC 296-17- 350(6) put State Roofing  
5 on notice that it should check with the Department every year to determine the proper average rate of  
6 compensation for respective classifications: "The records of the department as compiled for the  
7 preceding fiscal year ending June 30, shall be the basis for determining the average rate of  
8 compensation for each classification . . . ." (Emphasis supplied) However, State Roofing did check with  
9 the Department over the years. Mr. Smith checked with the Department's ESAC Division which was  
10 the only source of which he was aware in the Department providing information that would be relevant  
11 to the rule. The information he obtained was correct through 1985.  
12

13 Beginning in 1986, Mr. Smith's source within the Department itself became an incorrect source,  
14 not because of some change on Mr. Smith's part, but rather as we have previously explained, because  
15 the Industrial Insurance Division changed its own practice. The Division began using its own records,  
16 thereby deriving a lower average rate of compensation, rather than the ESAC Division figure. The  
17 Department had clearly established a pattern which it should have anticipated might induce employers  
18 to rely upon the ESAC Division prevailing wage rate, as the Department itself had done. Likewise, the  
19 Department should have reasonably anticipated that employer errors in the calculation of piece worker  
20 hours might result if proper notice of the change was not given to employers. WAC 296-17-350(6) is  
21 insufficient for this purpose. The rule does not in fact direct employers to contact the Department, let  
22 alone a particular division within the Department. The language which we have cited from the  
23 provision has not been amended to reflect any change over the years relevant to this particular case.  
24

25 In the final analysis, we believe that pointing to WAC 296-17- 350(6) underscores more the  
26 unreasonableness of the Department's inaction and silence on the subject than any unreasonableness  
27 on the part of State Roofing in relying upon the prior pattern established by the Department. We  
28 believe the change in practice by the Industrial Insurance Division constituted rule making within the  
29 meaning of this state's Administrative Procedure Act, whether considered under the definition of "rule"  
30 contained in former RCW 34.04.010(2) or the present RCW 34.05.010(15). The rule making  
31 requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act have been, and continue to be, applicable to the  
32 Department of Labor and Industries. Former RCW 34.04.010(1) and present RCW 34.05.010(2) and  
33 .030. The requirement that regulatory practices and changes of general applicability be made in the  
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1 form of published rules so as to properly put affected parties on notice is particularly relevant in the  
2 present case. Former RCW 34.04.025-.058 and present RCW 34.05.210-.395.

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4 In Ocosta School Dist. v. Brouillet, 38 Wn.App. 785, 689 P.2d 1382 (1984) the court held that  
5 bulletins from the Superintendent of Public Instruction did not suffice to meet Administrative Procedure  
6 Act rule making requirements with regard to deductions the Superintendent would take from statutory  
7 school district allocations for other revenues available to the districts. The bulletins were held  
8 insufficient even though the Superintendent had promulgated a rule under the Administrative  
9 Procedure Act designating bulletins as the source of such information. 38 Wn.App. at 787-791.  
10 Likewise, policies and practices followed by the Human Rights Commission in choosing tribunal  
11 members constituted rule making, subject to the rule making provisions of the Administrative  
12 Procedure Act. Milwaukee R.R. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wn.2d 802, 811- 13, 557 P.2d 307  
13 (1976).  
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19 State Roofing has not argued that the Department's piece worker calculations are invalid due to  
20 failure to properly adopt and promulgate rules under the Administrative Procedure Act. Rather, we  
21 simply note our own belief that the Department's failure to comply with the rule making and  
22 promulgation requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act was but another form of its silence and  
23 inaction which made State Roofing's reliance upon the former practice of the Department all the more  
24 reasonable.  
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28 In summary, we hold that, in the circumstances of this case, the Department is estopped from  
29 using an average rate of compensation other than \$19.50 in piece worker calculations in the roof  
30 worker classification 0507 for the audit period in question. The Department is not equitably estopped  
31 from using the correct average rate of compensation for piece workers in the shake mill classification  
32 1005. In so holding, we adopt from the Proposed Decision and Order Finding of Fact No. 1 and  
33 Conclusion of Law No. 1 and in addition make the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:  
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### 38 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

- 39 2. Beginning sometime in, or prior to, 1981 and continuing through 1985, the  
40 Industrial Insurance Division of the Department of Labor and Industries  
41 adopted as a policy and practice the use of the prevailing wage rate  
42 promulgated by the Department's Employment Standards-  
43 Apprenticeship-Crime Victims Division (ESAC) for roof workers as the  
44 "average rate of compensation" which the Industrial Insurance Division  
45 would use for calculations regarding the roof work classification 0507  
46 under the piece workers rule, WAC 296-17-350(6). The applicable  
47 average rate of compensation thus determined for classification 0507 for

1 the years 1981 and 1982 was \$19.50. Beginning in 1986, the Industrial  
2 Insurance Division changed its practice and policy regarding the source of  
3 the "average rate of compensation" which it would use for classification  
4 0507 under WAC 296-17-350(6). For the year 1986, the Department  
5 averaged the ESAC Division prevailing wage rate figure and a figure  
6 which the Department obtained by way of dividing the total gross wages  
7 reported to it by employers under classification 0507 by the number of  
8 hours the employers reported in the same classification. Thereafter, for  
9 years ensuing 1987 through at least June 30, 1988, the Industrial  
10 Insurance Division utilized the quotient obtained by dividing the gross  
11 wages reported by the number of hours reported to it by employers as the  
12 average rate of compensation under WAC 296-17-350(6). The  
13 Department did not adopt or promulgate any rule or regulation for  
14 publication in the Washington State Register or Washington Administrative  
15 Code describing this change, nor did the Department otherwise inform  
16 State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. of the change until the Industrial Insurance  
17 Division conducted a field audit of State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. after  
18 June 30, 1988.

- 19  
20 3. State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. utilized \$19.50 as the "average rate of  
21 compensation" under WAC 296-17-350(6) for calculation of reportable  
22 hours for its piece workers in classification 0507 from 1976 through June  
23 30, 1988. From time to time throughout this period, State Roofing &  
24 Insulation, Inc. contacted the Department's ESAC Division in order to  
25 obtain prevailing wage rate information for workers in classification 0507  
26 for purposes of meeting requirements for bids on public works contracts.  
27 Through these contacts with the ESAC Division, State Roofing &  
28 Insulation, Inc. learned that the prevailing wage rate remained close to  
29 \$19.50 and that the figure increased but never decreased during this  
30 same period. Reasonably relying upon this information, State Roofing &  
31 Insulation, Inc. believed that \$19.50 was acceptable to the Department's  
32 Industrial Insurance Division as the "average rate of compensation" for  
33 classification 0507 under WAC 296-17-350(6) at all times through June  
34 30, 1988. Throughout this period, State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. was not  
35 aware of any division other than ESAC in the Department which it should  
36 contact in order to obtain wage rate information for purposes of calculating  
37 worker hours in classification 0507 under WAC 296-17-350(6).
- 38 4. When the Department in 1986 altered its practice and policy for  
39 determining the average rate of compensation for classification 0507  
40 under WAC 296-17-350(6) the Department knew that the average rate of  
41 compensation figure would decrease and that employers continuing to  
42 compute worker hours in classification 0507 under the piece workers rule  
43 in WAC 296-17- 350(6) would incur a greater tax liability for the same total  
44 compensation paid a piece worker as compared to the previous practice  
45 and policy wherein ESAC Division prevailing wage rate figures had been  
46 used. This is true of State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. The amount of  
47 industrial insurance taxes for which it would be liable in classification 0507



1 under the piece worker rule for the period July 1, 1986 through June 30,  
2 1988 under the Department's new practice and policy would be  
3 substantially greater than the amount of taxes which it calculated and paid  
4 for classification 0507 using \$19.50 as the average rate of compensation.  
5 The industry in which State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. is involved is highly  
6 competitive. State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. would suffer financial loss if  
7 held liable for an increase in industrial insurance premiums attributable to  
8 piece workers in classification 0507 due to recalculation of reportable  
9 hours using an average rate of compensation lower than \$19.50 under  
10 WAC 296-17-350(6) for the period July 1, 1986 through June 30, 1988.

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- 12 5. An injury to State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. would result from allowing the  
13 Department of Labor and Industries to contradict or repudiate for the  
14 period July 1, 1986 through June 30, 1988 its prior acts, practice, and  
15 policy of allowing State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. to utilize \$19.50, or a  
16 higher figure, as the average rate of compensation for piece workers in  
17 classification 0507 for calculations under WAC 296-17-350(6). State  
18 Roofing & Insulation, Inc. reasonably relied upon the Department's prior  
19 allowance, practice, and policy.
- 20 6. During the period July 1, 1986 through June 30, 1988, State Roofing &  
21 Insulation, Inc. did not reasonably rely upon any admission, statement, or  
22 act of the Department when State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. utilized \$19.50  
23 as the average rate of compensation to calculate reportable hours of its  
24 piece workers under WAC 296-17- 350(6) in the shake mill classification  
25 1005. The applicable average rate of compensation for piece workers in  
26 classification 1005 was \$11.50 in 1986, \$12.00 in 1987, and \$12.00 in  
27 1988.

#### 28 **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

- 29
- 30 2. The Department of Labor and Industries is equitably estopped from  
31 utilizing a figure other than \$19.50 as the average rate of compensation  
32 under WAC 296-17-350(6) for State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. roof  
33 workers in classification 0507 for the period July 1, 1986 through June 30,  
34 1988.
- 35 3. The Department of Labor and Industries is not equitably estopped from  
36 utilizing \$11.50 for 1986, \$12.00 for 1987, and \$12.00 for 1988 as the  
37 average rates of compensation under WAC 296-17-350(6) of State  
38 Roofing & Insulation, Inc. shake mill workers in classification 1005 for the  
39 period July 1, 1986 through June 30, 1988.
- 40 4. The Order and Notice Reconsidering Notice and Order of Assessment of  
41 the Department of Labor and Industries dated April 20, 1989 which  
42 affirmed a Notice and Order of Assessment of Industrial Insurance Taxes  
43 No. 67064 dated December 30, 1988 which assessed industrial insurance  
44 taxes against State Roofing & Insulation, Inc. in the amount of  
45 \$122,731.74 for the period July 1, 1986 through June 30, 1988 is incorrect  
46 and is reversed. The Department is directed to recalculate the hours upon  
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1 which industrial insurance taxes should be paid for piece workers in  
2 classification 0507 for the same period using \$19.50 as the average rate  
3 of compensation in its calculations under WAC 296-17-350(6). Except for  
4 this modification, the new order shall in all other respects reflect the figures  
5 used and calculations made when the Department issued its orders dated  
6 December 30, 1988 and May 4, 1989.  
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8 It is so **ORDERED**.

9 Dated this 4<sup>th</sup> day of February, 1991.

10 BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS

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13  
14 /s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
15 SARA T. HARMON Chairperson

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17 /s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
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