| IN RE: JACK D. HAMILTON | ) | DOCKET NO. 03 14743 |
| ) | ||
| CLAIM NO. S-667968 | ) | DECISION AND ORDER |
| ) |
APPEARANCES:
Claimant, Jack D. Hamilton, by
Law Offices of Robyn L Pugsley P.S., per
Robyn L. Pugsley
Self-Insured Employer, Hecla Mining Company, by
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., per
Gregory M. Kane
The claimant,
Jack D. Hamilton, filed an appeal with the Board of Industrial Insurance
Appeals on
DECISION
Pursuant
to RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review
and decision on a timely Petition for Review filed by the self-insured
employer to a Proposed Decision and Order issued on
The Board has reviewed the evidentiary rulings in the record of proceedings and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are affirmed. We grant review to clarify our position on whether an award for permanent impairment compensates the worker for any future loss of earning capacity. In this particular case, the parties provided a stipulation of all the facts material to the issues raised by the appeal.
The claimant,
Jack D. Hamilton, injured his back during the course of his employment as a
miner with Hecla Mining Company on
As a result of
his injury, Mr. Hamilton was required to undergo an L4-S1 Steffee plate fusion
on
A little over
one year later, on
After Mr.
Hamilton recovered from his surgeries, his physicians released him to work as a
teacher's aide. When the vocational
counselor, Ruth Johnson, agreed that the claimant was able to work in this
capacity, time loss compensation was terminated as paid through
The parties
agree that for the period
The parties also stipulated that miners working for employers other than Hecla Mining Company during the applicable time period of September 29, 2000 through April 30, 2003, earned $27.65 an hour in 2000; $28.76 an hour from 2001-2002, and earned $29.90 an hour in 2003, in addition to receiving employer-sponsored health care benefits. We gather that this stipulated fact was offered in support of an adjustment as favorably acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Department of Labor & Indus., 43 Wn.2d 696 (1953). In Hunter, a worker prevented by his injury from returning to the job he had held at the time of his injury, had taken a lighter-duty but lesser-paying job with the same employer. Eventually, due to a general wage increase, his earnings at this lesser-paying job equaled what his earnings had been at the job at the time of his injury. It therefore appeared, and the Department had determined, that he no longer had a loss of earning capacity. However, the pay for the job held at the time of injury had also increased due to the same general wage increase. The Board had held, and the Court upheld the Board's determination, that the worker's general wage increase therefore did not reflect a decrease in disability or a restoration of earning power. Comparing the new differential between his current earning capacity and what the job at injury currently paid, the worker continued to have the same loss of earning capacity.
Here the parties' stipulation is specifically phrased to suggest that the specified increased wages for miners do not apply to miners employed by Hecla. In both Hunter and the Board's post-Hunter Significant Decision of In re Chester Brown, BIIA Dec., 88 1326 (1989), the Hunter adjustment is allowed where the earnings paid for the employment held at the time of injury have increased. We do not believe we can infer from this stipulation that Hecla miners continued to make only $11.90 per hour in 2000-2003. The Department would have to determine if a Hunter adjustment would be appropriate if loss of earning power benefits are paid. [4]
Perhaps Hecla no
longer had miners in 2000-2003 and the wage increases listed were intended by
the parties to reflect what Hecla miners would have made if there were still
mining jobs at Hecla. The Board has held
that in determining loss of earning power benefits of a worker who was a
prevailing wage union carpenter at the time of injury, it is appropriate to
look to evidence of what prevailing wage union carpenters are currently
making. In re Michael W. Haney,
Dckt. No. 89 3517 (
The parties'
Stipulation of Facts is also silent with respect to the wage being earned by
Hecla miners or miners employed by other employers as of
The stipulation does state that miners with employers other than Hecla continue to receive employer-sponsored health care benefits, although the cost of such benefits in the years 2000‑2003 is not stated. Thus, it is not known whether the cost of such benefits would be equal to, less than, or greater than the $245.19 amount being provided for Mr. Hamilton by Hecla at the time of his injury.
In his
memorandum in support of summary judgment, the claimant contends that he should
receive loss of earning power benefits calculated by taking into account the
above increase in wages paid to miners. Since the employer argues that the
claimant should not receive loss of earning power benefits, Hecla does not
address a Hunter adjustment. Hecla contends that Mr. Hamilton is not entitled to loss of earning
power benefits for the period 2000-2003, because his earning capacity (as a
teacher's aide) has actually increased by $1.06 per hour as compared to his
earning capacity at the time his claim was closed with a permanent partial
disability award in 1995.
Both Mr. Hamilton and Hecla agree that there
is no dispute as to any fact material to the issues raised by this appeal and
that the appeal can and should be decided as a matter of law under CR 56. As to the issue of whether Mr. Hamilton is
entitled to any loss of earning power benefits for the period at issue,
we agree that there is no dispute of any material fact, and we conclude that
Mr. Hamilton is entitled to summary judgment. Specifically, we order that Mr. Hamilton receive loss of earning
power benefits for the period
However, based on the Stipulation of Facts
submitted, we are unable to calculate the actual loss of earning power
sustained by Mr. Hamilton, and the amount of loss of earning power benefits to
which he is entitled. The claim is
remanded to the Department with direction to calculate and direct Hecla to pay
loss of earning power and/or time loss compensation benefits to the claimant
for the period of
The
dispute regarding Mr. Hamilton's entitlement to loss of earning power benefits
arises because of a conflict in the interpretation of RCW 51.32.090(3) between two different divisions of the Court of
Appeals. RCW 51.32.090(3) provides:
(a) As soon as recovery is so complete
that the present earning power of the worker, at any kind of work, is restored
to that existing at the time of the occurrence of the injury, the payments
shall cease. If and so long as the present earning power is only partially
restored, the payments shall:
(i) For claims for injuries that occurred before May 7, 1993,
continue in the proportion which the new earning power shall bear to the old;
Division
One of the Court of Appeals has held that, in an aggravation case under
RCW 51.32.160, a worker whose claim had been closed with a permanent
partial disability award is thereafter entitled to loss of earning power
benefits only if it is shown that the current earning capacity during the
aggravation period is less than that which the worker had at the time the claim
had been closed. Davis v. Bendix
Corp., 82 Wn. App. 267, rev. denied, 130 Wn.2d 1004 (1996). In a later case, Division Three of the Court
of Appeals disagreed with
On review of the Hubbard decision, the Supreme Court held that before loss of earning power benefits can even be considered, a worker who has filed a claim for aggravation must first make a threshold showing that, as a result of the aggravation, he was rendered temporarily and totally disabled or has suffered a decrease in earning power proximately resulting from the injury's aggravation. As to cases in which a worker had met that threshold, the Supreme Court left unresolved the conflict between Division One and Division Three as to whether loss of earning power benefits should be calculated based on earning capacity at the time of injury as opposed to earning capacity at the time the claim had been closed. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated: [6]
Because Hubbard has failed to make the
necessary threshold showing, this Court is not required to determine the
correct formula for calculating LEP benefits in an aggravation case where such
benefits are proper. Thus, we do not presently resolve the existing conflict in
the Court of Appeals as to whether "old" in RCW 51.32.090(3) refers
to the claimant's earning power when the original injury occurred or when the
claim was initially closed. Instead, we encourage the Legislature to clarify
its intent in RCW 51.32.090(3)(a) when a claimant seeks LEP benefits based upon
the aggravation of an injury for which he or she has already received a PPD
award.
Hubbard at 45.
The
Legislature has not acted to "clarify its intent" as suggested by the
Supreme Court. Thus, we are left with
the two conflicting decisions from the Courts of Appeal. We find the reasoning of the Court of Appeals
in the Hubbard decision to be a better statement of the law. The Court states that it is error to consider
loss of earning power in fixing an award for permanent partial disability. The opinion further states that permanent
partial disability compensates the worker for loss of bodily function, which is
distinguished from loss of earning power in each worker. Hubbard, at 747. We agree with the Court that the rationale
set forth in
The logic underlying this holding remains sound. A worker can have a permanent partial disability that in no way limits his earning capacity. Yet another worker with the same loss of function might find that the resulting loss of function severely reduces his earning capacity. For example, the earning capacity of the concert pianist who loses a finger would likely be greatly impacted by the impairment. But a lawyer who lost the same finger might have no loss of income whatsoever as a result of such impairment. Yet, both workers will receive the same permanent partial disability award. [7]
Of course, if the worker has an impairment that renders him unable to obtain and perform gainful employment on a reasonably continuous basis, he will instead receive a permanent total disability pension. RCW 51.08.160. If his permanent impairment severely affects his earning capacity, but still allows him to obtain and perform gainful employment on a reasonably continuous basis, his wage compensation is terminated once the claim is closed. That is because while the Industrial Insurance Act provides for temporary total disability benefits and temporary loss of earning power benefits while a claim is open, and permanent total disability benefits when a worker's condition becomes fixed and stable, our state workers' compensation system simply does not have a benefit designed to compensate a worker for "permanent loss of earning capacity." Responding to the absence of such a benefit by characterizing a permanent partial disability award as an award for lost future earning capacity is simply not logical.
In
the present case, Mr. Hamilton has met the threshold test required by the
Supreme Court in Hubbard. Specifically, after his claim was reopened for treatment, he was
temporarily and totally disabled, as a result of the aggravation of his injury,
from
1. On
On
On
On
On
2. The
claimant, Jack D. Hamilton, sustained an industrial injury on
3. On
December 7, 1995, Mr. Hamilton’s back condition, proximately caused by his
injury of March 18, 1985, was medically fixed and stable; he required no
further medically proper and necessary treatment; and his permanent impairment
due to the injury was best described by Category 5 of the categories of
permanent dorso-lumbar and lumbosacral impairments. As of
4. On
5. During
the period
6. During
the period
7. During
the period September 29, 2000 through April 30, 2003, miners working for
employers other than Hecla Mining Company earned: $27.65 per hour during the
period September 29, 2000 through December 31, 2000; $28.76 per hour during the
period January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2002; and $29.90 per hour during
the period January 1, 2003 through April 30, 2003. In addition, during the period
8. There are no genuine issues as to any fact material to the issues raised by this appeal.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this appeal, which raises no material issue of fact and can be decided as a matter of law.
2. As of April 30, 2003, the condition of the claimant, Jack D. Hamilton, proximately caused by his injury of March 18, 1985, was medically fixed and stable and he was no longer in need of proper and necessary medical services within the meaning of RCW 51.36.010.
3. As of
April 30, 2003, the condition of the claimant, Jack D. Hamilton, proximately
caused by his injury of March 18, 1985, had not become permanently aggravated,
and his permanent partial disability under RCW 51.32.080, proximately caused by
the injury of March 18, 1985, remained best described by Category 5 of the
categories of permanent dorso-lumbar and lumbosacral impairments, a disability
for which he had received an award when his claim was originally closed on
December 7, 1995. As of
4. During
the period
5. The order
of the Department dated
It is so ORDERED.
Dated this 22nd day of September, 2004.
BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS
________________________________________
THOMAS E. EGAN Chairperson
________________________________________
FRANK E. FENNERTY, JR. Member
________________________________________
CALHOUN
