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See LOSS OF EARNING POWER, Effect of not
working BEFORE THE BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS STATE OF |
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decision
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APPEARANCES:
Robinson & Kole, P.S., Inc.,
per
Dennis A. Kole
Employer, Canfor USA Corp., by
TOC Management Services, per
Joanne Collier
Department of Labor and
Industries, by
The Office of the Attorney
General, per
Kerena A. Higgins, Assistant
Docket No. 04 19814: Karl D. Bean, the claimant, filed a protest
with the Department of Labor and Industries on
Docket No. 05 15615: Mr. Bean filed an appeal with the Board on
In a Proposed Decision and Order
issued on
The Board has reviewed the
evidentiary rulings in the Board record.
We find no prejudicial error in these rulings. The evidentiary rulings are affirmed.
DECISION
Although directing benefits for other
periods, the industrial appeals judge denied Karl D. Bean loss of earning power
benefits for
Mr. Bean sustained this industrial
injury to his low back on
Dr. McCallum and Phillip Ballard,
M.D., a certified neurologist who examined Mr. Bean on
The industrial appeals judge did find
that Mr. Bean proved that he was entitled to time loss compensation for the
period
Finally, the industrial appeals judge
determined that Mr. Bean did not prove that he was unable to work between
We have previously found, in RCW
51.32.090, that there is no requirement that an injured worker must be actually
working in order to receive loss of earning power compensation to which the
worker would otherwise be entitled. In re Ralph Faulder, Jr., BIIA Dec., 94
2765 (1996). RCW 51.32.090(1) and
(2) provide full rate time loss compensation when "disability" from
employment is temporary but total. Where
earning power at any kind of work has been restored to earning power at the
time of injury, time loss compensation ceases.
We agree, as does Mr. Bean [4]
explicitly in his Petition for Review, that he is not entitled to full time
loss compensation for periods other than those already directed by the
industrial appeals judge. The issue for
decision here concerns only loss of earning power compensation. Where earning power is partially restored,
RCW 51.32.090(3)(a)(ii) provides that for claims for injuries occurring on or
after May 7, 1993, if a worker is indeed working during the period of contended
loss of earning power, the actually-earned wages may serve as the basis for
computing the loss of earning power compensation without going further to consider
whether those wages indeed reflect maximum earning capacity at the time. The worker may receive eighty percent (80%)
of the difference between these wages and earning power at the time of injury. However, the total of the compensation
payments and wages earned during the period may not exceed one hundred fifty
percent (150%) of the full time loss compensation rate. The statute further provides: "the
payments may not be less than the worker would have received if (a)(i) of this
subsection had been applicable to the worker's claim." The referenced portion, (a)(i) of the
subsection, provides that for claims arising for injuries that occurred before
May 7, 1993, the loss of earning power compensation is time loss compensation
"in the proportion which the new earning power shall bear to the
old." A further condition is stated
in (3)(b), that in either instance, no loss of earning power compensation is
payable unless "the loss of earning power shall exceed five percent."
Given the plain language of the statute, not reducing compensation to
less than entitlement under (a)(i), we have no hesitance in holding that, where
a worker is not working, but shows loss of earning power caused by the covered
injury greater than five percent, the worker is to receive the percentage of
time loss compensation that otherwise reflects the lost earning capacity. See also In
re Patricia Heitt, BIIA Dec., 87 1100 (1989). We therefore find that the Department's
orders are incorrect insofar as they deny Mr. Bean loss of earning power
compensation solely because he was not working during periods of contended
entitlement.
On the other hand, we recognize that
a worker may terminate, or be properly terminated from, employment following upon a period in which the
worker's earning power compensation had been previously calculated under RCW
51.32.090(3)(a)(ii) – using the eighty percent of difference between earning
capacity at injury and present wage method.
This is the circumstance in Mr. Bean's case. In such circumstances, we perceive no basis
in the law for continuing to calculate loss of earning power compensation under
the eighty percent method – i.e.,
based upon what the worker's actual earnings would have been had he or she
maintained the particular lesser paying employment. In clear statutory terms, that particular
method is premised upon the "actual [5]
difference between the worker's present
wages and earning power at the time of injury."
RCW 51.32.090(3)(a)(ii) (Emphasis added.)
Without present wages, the method
is inapplicable. Not only is this
apparent from a plain reading of the statute, this is also consistent with what
we believe to be policy presumptions underlying in the legislation: (a) that,
if a worker is indeed working, the worker is likely to be attempting to work at
or near maximum earning capacity within the limits imposed by his or her
injury; and (b) such efforts should be recognized by allowing for potentially
greater compensation when the worker does return to, and while he or she remains
in, the labor force – this being a primary goal of our workers' compensation
system. In any event, we believe the
statutory scheme is clear – where there is five percent or greater loss of
earning capacity, but the injured worker is not in fact working, then (3)(a)(i)
must apply – compensation is the time loss rate "in proportion which the
new earning power shall bear to the old."
Heitt.
We remand this
matter to the Department to provide the time loss compensation directed by the
industrial appeals judge. We also remand
the matter to the Department to consider Mr. Bean's entitlement to loss of
earning power compensation even though he was not actually employed during the
period
We have considered the Proposed
Decision and Order and Mr. Bean's Petition for Review. Based on a thorough review of the record
before us, we make the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On
2. On
3. Karl
D. Bean is 48 years old. He has an
eleventh grade education. On
4. The
industrial injury caused Mr. Bean to have a low back sprain/strain.
5. During
the period
6. On
7. Had
Mr. Bean not committed an act of insubordination at work on
8. Throughout
the period
9. As
of
10. Throughout the period December 30, 2003 through March 28, 2005,
due to the effects of his industrial injury, Mr. Bean was incapable of
performing the work in which he was employed at the time of the industrial injury.
He was during this period capable of working at least two hours a day,
five days a week as a bar coder for Canfor.
During this period of time Mr. Bean would have continued to be employed
in his position as a bar coder had he not committed an act of insubordination
on
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals
has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of these appeals.
2. Mr. Bean was not entitled to full time
loss compensation benefits pursuant to RCW 51.32.090 for the period
3. The fact that Mr. Bean was not employed
during the period October 2, 2003
through October 8, 2003, does not legally preclude Mr. Bean from entitlement to
loss of earning power benefits pursuant to RCW 51.32.090(3). Mr. Bean's loss of earning power benefits, if
any, during this period should be calculated by multiplying his time loss rate
by the percentage of lost earning capacity when comparing his earnings at the
time of injury to his earning capacity during the period October 2, 2003
through October 8, 2003, if such loss is five percent or greater.
4. Mr. Bean was entitled to full time loss
compensation for the period
5. Mr. Bean was not entitled to full time
loss compensation for the period
6. The fact that Mr. Bean was not employed
during the period December 30, 2003
through March 28, 2005, does not legally preclude Mr. Bean from entitlement to
loss of earning power benefits pursuant to RCW 51.32.090(3). Mr. Bean's loss of earning power benefits, if
any, during this period should be calculated by multiplying his time loss rate
by the percentage of lost earning capacity when comparing his earning at the
time of injury to his earning capacity during the period
7. The Department orders dated
It is so ORDERED.
Dated this 12th day of January, 2006.
BOARD
OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS
/s/________________________________________
THOMAS
E. EGAN Chairperson
/s/________________________________________
FRANK
E. FENNERTY, JR. Member