APPEARANCES:
Claimant, José R. Benavides, Pro Se
Self-Insured Employer,
J R Simplot Co., by
Evans, Craven
& Lackie, P.S., per
Gregory M. Kane
The
claimant, José R. Benavides,
filed an appeal with the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals on
January 28, 2005
, from an order of
the Department of Labor and Industries dated
January 13, 2005
. In this order, the Department affirmed its order of
October 21, 2004
, in which it affirmed a prior
order dated
July 29, 2004
,
in which the Department denied the claimant's application to reopen. The claimant's appeal is DISMISSED.
DECISION
Pursuant
to RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review
and decision on a timely Petition for Review filed by the claimant
to a Proposed Decision and Order issued on
January 25, 2007
, in which the industrial appeals judge dismissed the claimant’s appeal. All contested issues are addressed in this
order.
The
Board has reviewed the evidentiary rulings in the record of proceedings and
finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are affirmed. We have granted review to decide if our industrial appeals judge
properly dismissed this matter. In this
case, the pro se claimant, José Benavides, had a history of missed appearances. Fourteen conferences were held in this matter with poor attendance on
the part of Mr. Benavides or his representatives. While he secured both lay and legal
representation during the pendency of his appeal, his attention to the Board
proceedings remained unsatisfactory. Mr.
Benavides also failed to appear for two agreed examinations, which might have
lead to the resolution of his appeal. After his hearing was finally scheduled, our industrial appeals judge
properly issued a litigation order, in which she addressed pre-trial scheduling,
discovery, and post-hearing deadlines.
When the claimant’s attorney failed
to confirm witnesses on the specified deadline, the employer brought a motion
to dismiss. Our industrial appeals judge
scheduled a telephone hearing to hear oral argument on the motion. At this point, Mr. Benavides was represented
by counsel. His [2] attorney sent a letter one month prior to the confirmation
deadline, in which he indicated that they were unable to confirm any expert
witnesses. Despite that fact, Mr.
Benavides was unwilling to dismiss the appeal. During the telephone hearing, our industrial
appeals judge granted the motion to dismiss on the record. She indicated that she would memorialize her
ruling in a Proposed Decision and Order.
In supporting the actions of our
industrial appeals judge, we remain mindful of the Court of Appeals' ruling in Watt v. Weyerhauser, 18 Wn. App. 731
(1977). In the Watt opinion, the
court ruled that a worker’s appeal could be dismissed only at a hearing. A hearing was distinguished from a
conference. The court noted that, unlike
a conference, a hearing is a trial de novo on sworn testimony in which the
Board performs an essentially judicial function and the purpose is to decide
the issues on appeal. Mr. Watt’s appeal
was dismissed following the intial conference. At the first conference, the appeal was dismissed and held in suspension.
The
claimant
was given a certain amount of time to come forward with proof that he was ready
to proceed and had medical evidence in support of his appeal. After Mr. Watt’s attorney missed a suspension
deadline, the case was dismissed without a hearing.
Unlike Mr. Watt, Mr. Benavides was
represented by counsel in a hearing not a conference.
The
hearing
was held pursuant to due and proper notice, and the purpose was to determine
the disposition of the appeal. We
believe that this type of proceeding satisfies the requirement of Watt that a hearing precede a decision
to dismiss the appeal. Although the
claimant did not voluntarily dismiss his appeal, his counsel made the
representation that he would be unable to present a legally sufficient case. His attorney was obligated to ensure that Mr.
Benavides understood that the hearing on the motion could result in the
dismissal of his appeal. Based on the
pleadings and notices, there is no reason to question notice in this matter.
In the Watt ruling, the Court pointed out that the purpose of a hearing is
to decide the issues on appeal.
The
dispositive issue in Mr. Benavides case was his inability to present a prima
facie case. Mr. Benavides received
judgment on his appeal in the form of a dismissal.
The
fact that this hearing was conducted by phone with parties located throughout
the state did not detract from the dignity of the proceeding. Measures which preserve efficiency and
accommodate the partie
s s
hould be encouraged
provided that they do not interfere with the efficacy of the process.
Historically, this Board has adhered
to the principle that the least severe sanction should be imposed provided that
the purpose of discovery is not undermined. In re Waheed [3] Al‑Maliki, BIIA Dec., 01 14923 (2003). In a situation where a party fails to confirm
expert testimony, the prescribed remedy is to cancel the claimant’s hearing
time while reserving enough time for the claimant to present his own testimony. While confirmation of witnesses is one of the
factors underlying the dismissal, there is more at issue here.
The
claimant’s attorney admitted that he had no witnesses and was not planning on
securing any expert testimony for the hearing.
The
actual admission that the worker
cannot present a case, justifies the harsher remedy. This is not an issue of discovery, but an
issue of legal sufficiency as contemplated by CR 41(b). We stand behind the actions of our industrial
appeals judge. She properly scheduled a
hearing with due and proper notice to all parties. Her decision to dismiss the appeal was
correct, justified by the circumstances presented here, and consistent with her
duties and power pursuant to WAC 263-12-045(k).
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The claimant, José R. Benavides, filed an application for benefits with the
Department of Labor and Industries on
August
21, 2000
, in which he alleged that he sustained an industrial
injury in the course of employment with J.R. Simplot Company on
July 26, 2000
. In an order dated
August 25, 2000
, the claim was allowed. On
July
19, 2001
, the Department issued an order in which it closed the
claim without further award for time loss compensation or permanent partial
disability. On
September 10, 2001
, the claimant filed a
protest of the order of
July 19, 2001
,
and on
October 24, 2001
,
the Department issued an order in which it affirmed its order of
July 19, 2001
. The claimant filed an appeal of the order of
October 24, 2001
, on
December 10, 2001
. The Board granted the appeal under Docket No.
01 23234 on
January 8, 2002
,
and on
October 22, 2002
,
the Board entered an order in which it dismissed the appeal in Docket No. 01
23234.
On
July 19, 2004
, the claimant filed an
aggravation application. On
July 29, 2004
, the Department
entered an order in which it denied the aggravation application. On
August
19, 2004
, the claimant filed a protest of the order of
July 29, 2004
. On
September
23, 2004
, the Department issued an order in which it held its order
of
July 29, 2004
, in
abeyance. On
October 21, 2004
, the Department entered an
order in which it affirmed the order of
July
29, 2004
. On
November 4, 2004
, the claimant filed
a Notice of Appeal of the order of
October
21, 2004
; this appeal was assigned Docket
No. 04 24990. On
November 12, 2004
, the Department
issued an order in which it held its order of
October 21, 2004
, in abeyance. On
November
29, 2004
, the Board issued an order in which it granted the appeal
in Docket No. 04 24990. On
January 13, 2005
, the Department
issued an order in which it affirmed its order of
October 21, 2004
. On
January 28, 2005
,
the claimant filed a Notice of Appeal from the order of
January 13, 2005
. On
February
9, 2005
the Board entered an order in which it vacated its
November 29, 2004
order in
which it granted the appeal in Docket No. 04 24990. [4] On
February 10, 2005
, the Board entered an
order in which it granted the claimant's appeal of the
January 13, 2005
order under Docket
No. 05 10661.
2. The claimant failed to confirm any expert
testimony nor was he able to obtain any medical expert willing to testify on
his behalf.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals
has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this appeal.
2. Pursuant to CR 41(b), the claimant's
January 28, 2005
appeal of the
Department order of
January 13, 2005
,
is DISMISSED.
It is so ORDERED.
Dated
this 6th day of June, 2007.
BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS
/s/
THOMAS E. EGANChairperson
/s/
FRANK E. FENNERTY, JR.Member
/s/
CALHOUN DICKINSONMember