| IN RE: LYNNETTE A. MURRAY | ) | DOCKET NO. 41,887 |
| ) | ||
| Claim No. G 365806 | ) | DECISION AND ORDER |
| ) |
- APPEARANCES
- Claimant, Lynnette A. Murray, by
- Phillipps and Young, per
- Kenneth Phillipps
- Employer, Scott Paper Company, by
- Richard Johnson
- Department of Labor and Industries, by
- The Attorney General, per
- Richard R. Roth, Assistant
This is an appeal filed by the claimant on December 7, 1972, from an order of the Department of Labor and Industries dated November 16, 1972, which rejected the above-numbered claim on the ground that there was no proof of a specific in- jury at a definite time and place in the course of employment. Sustained.
DECISION
Pursuant to RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review and decision on a timely Petition for Review filed by the claimant to a Proposed Decision and Order issued by a hearing examiner for this Board on October 26, 1973, in which the order of the Department dated November 16, 1972 was sustained.
The issue in this appeal is whether or not the claimant sustained an industrial injury on April 1, 1972 in her employment for the Scott Paper Company.
From the record herein, it is quite apparent that she did not sustain an injury on April 1, 1972. The only thing which [2] occurred at that time was that she experienced a temporary feeling of tingling in the fingers of her right hand, such as a person feels when you "bump your crazy bone." She said she had felt such a tingling at various times in the past, both on the job and at home, when she would accidentally bump her elbow on an object. (This of course is a common phenomenon known to everyone.) However, she admitted she could not recall any particular incident of striking her elbow on or about April 1, 1972. She frankly stated that "There wasn't an incident then," and that the tingling "was nothing to get excited about," and that in any event it disappeared in a short period -- a few minutes at most.
The claimant did not seek any medical treatment until August 1, 1972, and then it was not for any "tingling" feeling, but for pain and weakness in the entire right arm, right shoulder, and neck. Her attending physician at that time, Dr. J. V. Curran, diagnosed a shoulder-hand syndrome or thoracic outlet syndrome emanating from the area where the nerves and vessels pass through the shoulder musculature. It was this condition which the doctor treated for somewhat more than three months thereafter. Dr. Curran's testimony was completely speculative and inconclusive insofar as establishing any causal relationship of this condition to any alleged injury on or about April 1, 1972 -- and, as heretofore observed, the claim- ant denied that any injury occurred then.
It is obvious, therefore, that the shoulder-hand syndrome for which this claim was filed did not result from any injury occurring in the course of claimant's employment on April 1, 1972. The Department's order of November 16, 1972, rejecting this claim, was clearly correct.
The claimant makes the assertion that the notice of appeal [3] filed herein on December 7, 1972, from the Department's order of November 16, 1972, in Claim No. G-365806, also was sufficient to constitute an appeal from another order of the Department issued on November 13, 1972, in Claim No. S-105979. (That claim was a separate claim, filed prior to the filing of the instant claim, in which the claimant's same shoulder-hand syndrome condition was alleged to have resulted from an industrial injury of July 18, 1972.) She testified that she had intended to file an appeal with reference to the claim for the July 18, 1972 alleged injury.
However, claimant's assertion that she filed a recognizable appeal in the S-105979 claim is not tenable. Regardless of what the claimant may have intended in her mind, the important point is that the written document itself must, at least, indicate to the recipient thereof an intent to appeal and what decision or order of the Department is intended to be challenged by the appeal. Such minimum requirement is implicit in the statutory language of RCW 51.52.060 and 51.52.070. Examination of the contents of the notice of appeal received on December 7, 1972 makes it obvious that it conveys no indication of any intent to appeal from the Department's order concerning the alleged July 18, 1972 injury. The appeal document in no way challenges the Department's order of November 13, 1972, which clearly referred to the injury date of July 18, 1972, and was entered under Claim No. S-105979. Rather, the appeal specifically gives notice of intent to appeal, solely regarding Claim No. G-365806 and solely regarding the Department's order of November 16, 1972 entered under this claim. There is no intent to appeal the S-105979 claim, either expressed or implied, in this notice of appeal. For a holding similar in principle, see Royce v. Department of Labor & [4] Industries, 193 Wash. 488.
After consideration of the Proposed Decision and Order and the Petition for Review filed thereto, and a careful review of the entire record before us, we are persuaded that the Proposed Decision and Order is supported by the preponderance of the evidence and is correct as a matter of law.
The hearing examiner's proposed findings, conclusions and order are hereby adopted as this Board's findings, conclusions and order and are incorporated herein by this reference.
It is so ORDERED.
Dated this 6th day of November, 1974.
BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS
/s/
PHILLIP T. BORK Chairperson
/s/
R. M. GILMORE Member