| IN RE: JOHN HOERNER, DEC'D. | ) | DOCKET NO. 67,267 |
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| Claim No. 7006840 | ) | DECISION AND ORDER |
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- APPEARANCES
Widow-petitioner, Johanna Hoerner, by- Raekes, Rettig, Osborne and Forgette, per
- Philip M. Raekes
Employer, George Grant, Inc.,- None
Department of Labor and Industries, by- The Attorney General, per
- Laurie Connelly, Assistant
This is an appeal filed by the widow-petitioner on March 19, 1984 from an order of the Department of Labor and Industries dated February 28, 1984, which denied benefits for Johanna Hoerner for the reason that the decedent's death on December 21, 1983 was a result of a suicide and that the suicide was the result of a deliberate and conscious attempt on the part of the decedent to take his own life. Reversed and remanded.
DECISION
Pursuant to RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review and decision on a timely Petition for Review filed by the Department of Labor and Industries to a Proposed Decision and Order issued on July 20, 1984, in which the order of the Department dated February 28, 1984 was reversed, and the claim remanded to the Department with instructions to award Johanna Hoerner a widow's pension pursuant to RCW 51.32.050(6).
The general nature and background of this appeal are as set forth in the Proposed Decision and Order and shall not be reiterated herein.
RCW 51.32.050(6) provides in material part:
"If the injured worker dies during the period of permanent and total disability, whatever the cause of death, leaving a surviving spouse, or child, or children, the surviving spouse or child or children shall receive benefits as if death resulted from the injury ..."
RCW 51.32.020 provides in material part: [2]
"If injury or death results to a worker from the deliberate intention of the worker himself or herself to produce such injury or death, or while the worker is engaged in the attempt to commit, or the commission of, a felony, neither the worker nor the widow, widower, child, or dependent of the worker shall receive any payment under this title."
Quare: Given the above two statutory provisions, is the widow of a worker who, at the time of his death was in the status of permanent total disability due to an earlier industrial injury, entitled to the benefits provided for a surviving spouse under the Act where the worker's death resulted from his "deliberate intention" to take his own life?
Although both of the above-cited statutory provisions have been, in essentially the same pertinent language, part of our Workers' Compensation Act since its original enactment in 1911, the question presented, so far as we are aware, is one of first impression. See Laws of 1911, chapter 74, sections 5 and 6. The resolution of the question, we think, lies in the application of two fundamental precepts, to wit:
(1) The Act is remedial and its provisions are to be liberally construed in favor of its intended beneficiaries. Lowry v. Department of Labor and Industries, 21 Wn.2d 538 (1944).
(2) Different sections or provisions of the same Act should be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to each and avoid a conflict. Beech v. Board of Adjustment of Snohomish County, 73 Wn.2d 343 (1968).
Viewed on their face, the two subject enactments appear to conflict. RCW 51.32.050(6) purports to grant survivors' benefits where the worker is permanently and totally disabled at the time of death even if the cause of death be suicide ("whatever the cause of death"), whereas RCW 51.32.020 purports to deny benefits where death is by suicide ("deliberate intention") even if the decedent was permanently totally disabled at the time of death. Thus, we are seemingly confronted with the choice of which provision applies to the [3] exclusion of the other, thereby compromising the integrity of whichever provision is not given prevailing effect. Such an approach, however, assumes that both provisions speak to the same thing; in our opinion, they do not.
In our view, RCW 51.32.020, the so-called suicide statute, is addressed to those situations where the claim for benefits hinges upon the compensability of the death itself -- i.e., the claim is that the death itself was industrially caused or related. On the other hand, under RCW 51.32.050(6), the cause of death is immaterial inasmuch as the claim for benefits is not predicated upon the death itself, but upon the decedent's industrial status at the time of death, to wit, his status of permanent total disability. Unlike a claim predicated upon the compensability of the death itself, a valid claim for benefits of a surviving spouse under RCW 51.32.050(6) results in no new or unexpected cost to the employer or the Accident Fund. Provision for such benefits had already been factored into the pension reserve of the permanently totally disabled worker. The amount necessary to support a disabled worker of that status, including the amount necessary for spouse's benefits (and children's benefits, if any) is routinely established and reserved at the time permanent total disability is adjudicated. Such was the circumstance when Mr. Hoerner was originally placed on the pension rolls in 1970.
In sum, we hold that RCW 51.32.020 does not bar a claim for benefits by a surviving spouse where the worker's death by suicide takes place while the worker is in a status of permanent total disability. In making this determination, we are not unmindful of the court's opinion in McFarland v. Department of Labor and Industries, 188 Wash. 357 (1936). In this respect, it is sufficient to note that the court's discussion therein as to the law regarding the widow's claim for pension, based upon an alternative allegation that her husband was permanently and totally disabled at the time of his [4] self-inflicted death, is dictum. The court's discussion in this regard appears to have been prompted by its desire to distinguish certain factual premises and legal contentions then before it from those previously before it in Wintermute v. Department of Labor and Industries, 183 Wash. 169 (1935). Be that as it may, the court's actual holding in McFarland is based upon the "deliberate intention" language of RCW 51.32.020. In a word, the court upheld the widow's claim for benefits on the ground that her husband's death was caused by the industrial injury and was not due to his deliberate intent, which holding was completely dispositive of the case. That issue is not even present in this case.
As a final word, we would parenthetically note that the question herein decided was before this Board in In Re Abraham Winter, Dec'd., Claim No. C-052803, Docket No. 63,541. The Proposed Decision and Order in that matter, which reached a conclusion contrary to our holding herein, ultimately became the final disposition in the case inasmuch as no Petition for Review was filed by any party to the Board. In other words, the Board itself never passed upon the question at hand. We have now done so.
The Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Order entered on July 20, 1984 are hereby adopted as the Board's final findings, conclusions, and order, and are incorporated herein by this reference.
It is so ORDERED.
Dated this fifteenth day of February, 1985.
BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS
/s/
MICHAEL L. HALLChairperson
/s/
FRANK E. FENNERTY, JR.Member
/s/
PHILLIP T. BORKMember