| IN RE: BEN RAMAHLO | ) | DOCKET NO. 85 C025 |
| ) | ||
| CLAIM NO. V-851126 | ) | DECISION AND ORDER |
| ) |
- APPEARANCES
Claimant, Ben Ramahlo, and- Guardian, April Ramahlo, by
- Anderson, Caraher, Brown & Burns, per
- Randall M. Johnson
Department of Labor and Industries, by- The Attorney General, per
- Barbara Gary and Pamela Morse, Assistants
This is an appeal filed by the claimant through his guardian on October 10, 1985, from an order of the Department of Labor and Industries dated August 9, 1985, which adhered to the provisions of an order issued on June 13, 1985. That order rejected the claimant's application for benefits because it was not filed within one year of the date the criminal act of which he was a victim took place, as required by RCW 7.68.060(1). Reversed and remanded.
DECISION
Pursuant to RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review and decision on a timely Petition for Review filed by the Department of Labor and Industries to a Proposed Decision and Order issued on October 2, 1986, in which the order of the Department dated August 9, 1985, was reversed, and the claim remanded to the Department with directions to allow the application for benefits. [2]
The Board has reviewed the evidentiary rulings in the record of proceedings and finds that no prejudicial error was committed and said rulings are hereby affirmed.
Ben Ramahlo, who was born on January 3, 1975, attended a day care facility between July 1977, and December 1983. During that time, he was sexually assaulted on at least one occasion by Earl Erskine, the day care operator's husband, although Ben, due to his tender age, was unaware that he was the victim of a crime. April Ramahlo, Ben's mother, first learned of the assault in February 1985, and on the 18th day of the month, she reported the crime to the Pierce County Sheriff's Office. On Ben's behalf, April filed an application for crime victim benefits with the Department of Labor and Industries on March 4, 1985. The Department rejected the application because it was not filed within one year of the date the criminal activity took place. This appeal followed.
The issue before this Board is whether the claimant's application for benefits is barred by RCW 7.68.060(1). Ben Ramahlo presents several arguments that it is not.
Ben Ramahlo through counsel argues that amendments to the statute which were enacted after he filed his claim apply retroactively and extend the time within which he had to file the claim. At the time Mr. Ramahlo filed his claim, RCW 7.68.060(1) provided:
For the purposes of applying for benefits under this chapter, the rights, privileges, responsibilities, duties, limitations and procedures contained in RCW 51.28.010, 51.28.030, 51.28.040 and 51.28.060 as now or hereafter amended shall apply: Provided, That no compensation of any kind shall be available under this chapter if:
(a) An application for benefits is not received by the Department within one [3] year after the date the criminal act or the date the rights of dependents or beneficiaries accrued.
The Legislature amended the statute in 1985 to provide that a crime victim could file a claim within one year after the date the criminal act was reported to a local police department or sheriff's office. RCW 7.68.060. If this amendment is applied retroactively, Mr. Ramahlo's claim was filed in timely fashion since it was filed within three weeks of the criminal activity being reported to the police.
The 1985 amendment was, however, limited to criminal acts occurring after December 31, 1985. Section 3, Sec. 17, Ch. 443, Laws of 1985 uncodified. An amendment passed in 1986 was also limited to criminal acts reported after December 31, 1985. RCW 7.68.060: Senate Amended SHB 1869, page 2, 11. 5-7.
Mr. Ramahlo correctly asserts that the Crime Victims Compensation Act is a remedial statute. RCW 7.69.010; Haddenham v. State, 87 Wn.2d 145 (1976). If the purpose of such a statute is furthered by retroactive application of an amendment, retroactivity is presumed unless a contrary intent appears. Agency Budget Corporation v. Washington Insurance Guaranty Association, 93 Wn.2d 416 (1980). The language in the amendments limiting their application to acts which occurred or which were reported after December 31, 1985, unmistakably evidences a legislative intent of prospective application. The statute as it read on March 4, 1985, applies to Mr. Ramahlo's application for benefits.
RCW 7.68 is silent on the issue of the effect of a crime victim's minority, incapacity, or incompetency on the time for filing a claim for benefits. If a strict construction is given the requirements of [4] the statute, as was done by the Department, Mr. Ramahlo must, of course, be denied benefits. Given the facts of this case, such would, indeed, be a harsh and inequitable result.
Mr. Ramahlo urges that alternative means exist for the Board to avoid a strict construction of the filing requirement. First, he contends that the Washington Administrative Code grants this Board the equitable power necessary to find his claim timely filed. WAC 263-12-045(2)(f) provides:
It shall be the duty of the industrial appeals judge to conduct conferences or hearings in cases assigned to him or her in an impartial and orderly manner. The industrial appeals judge shall have the authority, subject to other provisions of these rules: to secure and present in an impartial manner such evidence, in addition to that presented by the parties, as he or she deems necessary to fairly and equitably decide the appeal, . . .
An administrative tribunal possesses no inherent powers and it may exercise only those powers granted to it by the document which creates it. Tacoma v. Civil Service Board of Tacoma, 6 Wn. App. 600, 494 P.2d 1380 (1972); State v. Higher Education Personnel Board, 16 Wn. App. 642, 558 P.2d 1364, (1976). The cited Code subsection pertains only to the authority of an industrial appeals judge to secure evidence in addition to that presented by the parties. Neither the statute or any other section of the administrative code which sets forth the powers and duties of this Board grant the broad, generic equitable power urged by Mr. Ramahlo.
The claimant encourages this Board to be guided by case law developed in workers compensation cases in determining whether he was excused from the filing requirements of RCW 7.68.060(1) because of his minority. No such case is directly on point with the facts before us. [5]
Neither Ames v. Department of Labor and Industries, 176 Wash. 509, 30 P.2d 239 (1934) nor Rodriguez v. Department of Labor and Industries, 85 Wn.2d 949, 540 P.2d 1359 (1975), is authority regarding the impact of one's minority on statutes of limitation. Ames, supra, involved a claimant who was insane; Mr. Rodriguez was illiterate. Furthermore, as pointed out by the Department, both cases involve the statute of limitations for filing an appeal before this Board, not the time limitation for filing a claim for worker's compensation benefits per RCW 51.28.050. RCW 51.28.050 is a non-claim statute which cannot be waived by application of equitable principles. Wheaton v. Department of Labor and Industries, 40 Wn.2d 56, 240 P.2d 567 (1952).
RCW 7.68.060 also is a non-claim statute. Reliance on the workers' compensation case law cited by claimant does not permit us to reach the result advocated by Mr. Ramahlo.
The central question before us is whether the two statutes are so similar as to lead us inexorably toward application of the law interpreting the Industrial Insurance Act to the Crime Victims Compensation Act. At first glance, Chapter 7, RCW seems to incorporate a great deal of the law of worker's compensation. RCW 7.68.030 mandates application of RCW 51.04.020, .030, .040, .050, and .100 to its subject matter and authorizes adoption of other provisions of RCW 51.04, as appropriate in keeping with the intent of the Crime Victims Compensation Act.
We note that RCW 51.04.070 makes a minor worker sui juris for purposes of the Industrial Insurance Act. It is reasonable to hold a person who is old enough to work, albeit a minor, to the same standard of compliance as an adult for filing claims for injuries. We also note [6] that RCW 7.68.030 does not mandate adoption of the sui juris statute in crime victim compensation cases and, since such a statute is inappropriate to the purpose of the act before us, we determine that minors are not sui juris for purposes of filing claims for Crime Victim Compensation Act benefits.
It is enlightening to reflect that the Legislature must have contemplated that failure to include a sui juris statute would lead to application of a different standard for filing claims by injured minors than adults, else it would not have specifically adopted it in the Industrial Insurance Act. Viewed in that light, the failure to include a sui juris statute in the Crime Victim Compensation Act seems to demonstrate a legislative intent that a different standard apply to minors than to adults in filing for benefits as a crime victim.
It is of interest that those sections of RCW 51.04 which are required to be followed in administering Chapter 7, RCW deal only with procedures to be followed in administering the claims. From the statute, itself, we can discern no reason why case law of worker's compensation must be followed in all cases in interpreting the rights of victims of crime. It appears, as recited in RCW 7.68.010, that the legislative twine binding the two statutes was manufactured only to provide a convenient method of computing the benefits payable to crime victims and in order to provide an already in place means of administering the claims.
In determining whether it is appropriate to use workers' compensation case law as a guideline in all aspects of defining the rights of crime victims, we must look to the fundamental nature of the statutes. While they are similar in many respects, the Industrial [7] Insurance Act is, in fact, a statute enacted in derogation of common law. It extinguished the right of injured workers to sue negligent employers and co-employees in tort, providing an exclusive remedy in its place. RCW 51.04.010. A statute which is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed. Keller v. City of Bellingham, 92 Wn.2d 726 (1979); McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wn.2d 265 (1980). Thus, because of its fundamental nature, cases are manifold which hold that while the Industrial Insurance Act should be liberally construed in favor of those who come within its terms, people who claim rights and benefits thereunder should be held to strict proof of their right to receive the benefits provided by the act. Cyr v. Department of Labor and Industries, 47 Wn.2d 92 (1955); Olympia Brewing Co. v. Department of Labor and Industries, 34 Wn.2d 498 (1949).
The Crime Victims Compensation Act, in contrast to the Industrial Insurance Act, is a truly remedial statute, providing a means of relief to victims of crime in addition to that existing at common law. A remedial statute is not to be strictly construed against its intended beneficiaries. State v. Douty, 92 Wn.2d 930 (1979). RCW 7.68.060 should not, therefore, be strictly construed against victims of crime who are too young to appreciate their status as victims.
In light of the differences in the fundamental nature of the statutes, we believe it is more appropriate to look for guidance to common law and statutes interpreting intentional torts than to cases interpreting the Industrial Insurance Act in construing the effect of minority on the period within which a crime victim has to file a claim. [8]
The victim of an assault has two years within which to file a civil action against the perpetrator. RCW 4.16.100. Furthermore, RCW 4.16.190 tolls the filing requirement for minors. That statute provides:
If a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter, except for a penalty or forfeiture, or against a sheriff or other officer, for an escape, be at the time the cause of action accrued either under the age of 18 years, or incompetent or disabled to such a degree that he or she cannot understand the nature of the proceedings, such incompetency or disability as determined according to chapter 11.88 RCW, or imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a court for a term less than his natural life, the time of such disability shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of action.
A minor victim of assault retains the right, no matter whether he or she receives Crime Victims Compensation Act benefits, to sue the perpetrator within the time limits expanded by RCW 4.16.190. We see no reason to distinguish those common law and statutory rights from rights the victim has under Chapter 7, RCW, especially given the remedial nature of the Act.
Accordingly, we believe that Mr. Ramahlo's claim for benefits was timely filed. The Department order of August 9, 1985, which adhered to the provisions of an order issued on June 13, 1985, which rejected the application for benefits because the claim was not filed within one year of the date of the criminal act should be reversed and this claim remanded to the Department with directions to allow the claim and to take such other and further action as is consistent with the law and the facts. [9]
FINDING OF FACT
- On March 4, 1985, the claimant, by and through his guardian, applied for benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, alleging a criminal act occurred with resulting injury on December 1, 1983. On June 13, 1985, the Department issued an order denying the claim on grounds the application for benefits was not received by the Department within one year after the date of the criminal act as is required by RCW 7.68.060(1). On August 6, 1985, the claimant, by and through his attorney, protested and requested reconsideration of the Department's order of June 13, 1985. On August 9, 1985, the Department issued an order adhering to the provisions of the Department order of June 13, 1985. On October 10, 1985, the claimant filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals from the Department's August 9, 1985, order. On October 22, 1985, this Board issued an order granting the appeal, subject to proof of timeliness, assigning it Docket No. 85 C025 and directing that further proceedings be held.
- The Department order dated August 9, 1985, was received by the claimant on August 15, 1985, and he placed his notice of appeal to this Board in the United States mails, postage prepaid, on October 9, 1985.
- Ben Ramahlo was born on November 3, 1975, and attended a day care facility between July 1977, and December 1983.
- Between July 1977, and December 1983, Ben Ramahlo was sexually assaulted on at least one occasion by Earl Erskine, the day care operator's husband.
- Because of his tender age, Ben Ramahlo was not aware that he was the victim of a crime at the time it occurred.
- April Ramahlo, Ben Ramahlo's mother, first learned of the incidence of sexual assault in February 1985.
- On February 18, 1985, April Ramahlo reported the crime to the Pierce County Sheriff's Office.
- On March 4, 1985, the Department of Labor and Industries, Crime Victim Section, received an application for crime victim benefits filed by April Ramahlo on behalf of Ben Ramahlo. [10]
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
- The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter of this appeal.
- Because of Ben Ramahlo's tender age and inability to appreciate his status as a victim of crime, the time limit he had under RCW 7.68.060(1) to file a claim for Crime Victim Compensation Act benefits was expanded by RCW 4.16.190 and his application was filed in timely fashion.
- The claimant's appeal to this Board was filed in timely fashion within the meaning of RCW 51.52.060.
- The order of the Department of Labor and Industries dated August 9, 1985, which adhered to the provisions of an order dated June 13, 1985, which rejected the claim on grounds the claimant did file an application for benefits within one year of the date of the criminal act as required by RCW 7.68.060(1) is incorrect and should be reversed and the claim remanded to the Department with directions to allow the application for benefits and to take such other and further action as is indicated by the law and the facts.
It is so ORDERED.
Dated this 11th day of February, 1987.
BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS
/s/
GARY B. WIGGSChairperson
/s/
FRANK E. FENNERTY, JR.Member
/s/
PHILLIP T. BORKMember