| IN RE: ROBERT A. HEDBLUM | ) | DOCKET NO. 88 2237 |
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| CLAIM NO. K-307268 | ) | DECISION AND ORDER |
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- APPEARANCES
This is an appeal filed by the claimant on May 26, 1988 from an order of the Department of Labor and Industries dated April 27, 1988 adhering to the Department order of October 9, 1987 rejecting the claim on the basis that the condition was not the result of the exposure alleged; that there was no industrial injury as defined by the industrial insurance laws; that the condition preexisted the alleged injury and was not related thereto; and that the condition was not an occupational disease as contemplated by RCW 51.08.140. Reversed and remanded.
DECISION
Pursuant to RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review and decision on a timely Petition for Review filed by the claimant to a Proposed Decision and Order issued on April 18, [2] 1989 in which the order of the Department dated April 27, 1988 was affirmed.
The Board has reviewed the evidentiary rulings in the record of proceedings and finds that no prejudicial error was committed and said rulings are hereby affirmed.
The issues presented by this appeal and the evidence presented by the parties are adequately set forth in the Proposed Decision and Order.
Mr. Hedblum alleges he suffered an industrial injury or developed an occupational disease during the course of his employment as a senior analyst programmer with U.S. Intelco Networks, Inc. on April 18, 1987. On Saturday, April 18, 1987 Mr. Hedblum was working overtime to complete a computer program scheduled to go into production on Monday, April 20th. Shortly after beginning work on Saturday, Mr. Hedblum informed his supervisor that he had "lost the program". Believing he had completely deleted the program and it could not be reconstructed by Monday, Mr. Hedblum became anxious and confused. He left the building stating he needed some fresh air. He never returned to work for U.S. Intelco.
Mr. Hedblum sought help from Stephen M. Langer, a clinical psychologist. Mr. Hedblum's condition was diagnosed as an anxiety reaction, which Dr. Langer attributed to the emotional stress caused by Mr. Hedblum's work situation at U.S. Intelco on August 18, 1987.
We agree with the analysis set forth in the Proposed Decision and Order that Mr. Hedblum has not established that he suffers from an occupational disease as defined by RCW 51.08.140. However, we disagree [3] with the conclusion of the Industrial Appeals Judge that the incident of April 18, 1987 did not constitute an industrial injury.
Based on his interpretation of Sutherland v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 4 Wn.App. 333, 481 P.2d 453 (1971), the Industrial Appeals Judge concluded that only emotional stress of an "unusual" nature could constitute an industrial injury as that term is defined in RCW 51.08.100. We disagree with this interpretation. We believe that the court in Sutherland referred to "unusual" emotional stress because the medical condition developed by the claimant in that case was a heart attack. Under Windust v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 52 Wn.2d 33, 323 P.2d 241 (1958), a heart attack is not compensable as an industrial injury unless it is caused by "unusual" physical exertion or emotional stress. Mr. Hedblum did not suffer a heart attack, but developed a mental condition as a result of the emotional stress occurring during the course of his employment on the morning of April 18, 1987. In this case, there is no requirement that the emotional stress be of an "unusual" nature. See In re Laura Cooper, BIIA Dec., 54,585 (1981) at 4.
We turn then to the question of whether Mr. Hedblum has established a causal relationship between the mental condition he developed and his sudden realization that the computer program had been erased and lost. The only health care provider to testify was Dr. Langer, the clinical psychologist who treated Mr. Hedblum seven times between May 12, 1987 and July 16, 1987. Before we can determine if the testimony of Dr. Langer is sufficient to establish a prima facie case, we must decide whether, under the industrial insurance laws, a clinical [4] psychologist is qualified to give an opinion on the causal relationship between a mental condition and an event occurring at work.
In 1973, this Board addressed the question of whether a chiropractor is qualified as an expert witness to testify as to the causal relationship between a claimant's low back condition and his on- the-job injury. In re Everett Pfenniger, BIIA Dec., 41,425 (1973). Based on our determination that chiropractic is recognized as a special field of the healing arts, we recognized that a chiropractor can testify as to the causal relationship of those conditions which fall within the scope and field of practice of a chiropractor's license.
The recent Court of Appeals decision in Dobbins v. Commonwealth Aluminum Corp., 54 Wn App 788, P.2d (1989) is not inconsistent with this view. Dobbins merely held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding chiropractic testimony on the question of causal relationship, since that testimony went beyond the scope of chiropractic practice as authorized by the Washington statute. Thus, even though the witness in Dobbins was licensed to practice chiropractic under the broader scope of the Oregon statute, his testimony could be excluded since it related to a knee condition, an area which is beyond the scope of a Washington chiropractic license. However, nothing in Dobbins disturbs our determination in Pfenniger that a chiropractor is not precluded from testifying with respect to the causal relationship of a back condition to an industrial injury so long as the testimony is within the area of expertise encompassed by the definitional statute, RCW 18.25.005.
The Legislature has determined that as a safeguard for the people of this state, psychologists, like chiropractors, are required to be [5] licensed. RCW 18.83.020. The practice of psychology, as defined by statute, includes counseling and guidance and the use of psychotherapeutic techniques with clients who have adjustment problems in the family, at school, at work, or in interpersonal relationships. RCW 18.83.101(1). By regulation, the specific functions of a psychologist may include mental health counseling. WAC 308-122-400.
With respect to industrial insurance claims, a psychologist is defined as a "practitioner". WAC 296-20-01002. The Department's regulations state: "Only that treatment which falls within the scope and field of the practitioner's license to practice will be allowed as treatment to an injured worker." WAC 296-20-015. Following the reasoning set forth in Pfenniger, we find that a licensed clinical psychologist can testify on the issue of causal relationship as to mental conditions -- matters that fall within the scope and field of practice of a clinical psychologist's license.
What we have before us, then, is a mental/mental industrial injury case. Mr. Hedblum is held to no greater or lesser burden of proof on the question of the causal relationship of his psychiatric condition to on-the-job stress than would apply in any industrial injury case.
The sole expert witness to testify was Dr. Langer; his opinion that the stressful on-the-job incident of April 18, 1987 caused Mr. Hedblum's anxiety reaction therefore stands unrebutted. Furthermore, the connection between the two simply makes sense.
On April 18, 1987, Mr. Hedblum discovered that a code was missing from the program he was working on and that he would not be able to meet the April 20, 1987 deadline for project completion. He told his supervisor and left the building. After driving around aimlessly for a [6] number of hours, he went home. In the late evening of April 18, 1987 he related the events of the day to his wife and indicated he was never going to return to work at Intelco. Indeed he did not return to work on the following Monday. Instead, his wife found him "huddled up" in the bathroom and he refused to call his employer.
After a visit to his family doctor, he was referred to Dr. Langer, who first saw him on May 12, 1987 and diagnosed an anxiety reaction caused by on-the-job stress. While it is apparent from Dr. Langer's testimony that the unfortunate incident of April 18, 1987 acted upon Mr. Hedblum's preexisting psychological makeup, it is equally apparent that under our industrial insurance scheme we must take workers as we find them. See Metcalf v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 168 Wash. 305, 11 P.2d 821 (1932). Additionally, it is clear that the requirements of proof for an industrial injury are not as stringent under our system as the requirements of proof for an occupational disease. An industrial injury need not arise naturally and proximately out of employment; it must only occur during the course of employment. Proof that an on-the- job incident proximately caused the condition complained of will suffice. Furthermore, the objective corroboration requirements imposed by Favor v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 53 Wn.2d 698, 336 P.2d 382 (1959) as to mental/mental and mental/physical occupational disease cases, are not applicable to industrial injury cases.
Finally, the clear distinction between a mental/mental industrial injury and a mental/mental occupational disease is apparent from the legislative enactment of RCW 51.08.142 in 1988.(1) While this statute [7] directed the Department to adopt a rule "that claims based on mental conditions or mental disabilities caused by stress do not fall within the definition of occupational disease in RCW 51.08.140", it was silent with respect to mental/mental industrial injuries. The Department WAC promulgated pursuant to RCW 51.08.142 specifically provides that "[s]tress resulting from exposure to a single traumatic event will be adjudicated with reference to RCW 51.08.100", i.e., the industrial injury statute. WAC 296-14-300(2).
For the foregoing reasons we have viewed this record in the same manner as we would view any record raising the issue of whether the worker has sustained an industrial injury within the meaning of RCW 51.08.100. Based on the fact that Dr. Langer has been licensed as a psychologist in the State of Washington since 1984; that he treated Mr. Hedblum seven times between May 12, 1987 and July 16, 1987, releasing him to return to work as of June 16, 1987; that he set forth specific findings to support his conclusions; and that no expert witnesses were presented to contradict his diagnosis and conclusions, we accept Dr. Langer's opinion that there is a causal relationship between the particular emotional stress Mr. Hedblum experienced on the job on the morning of April 18, 1987, and the anxiety reaction which was produced as an immediate result.
After consideration of the Proposed Decision and Order and the Petition for Review filed thereto, and a careful review of the entire record before us, we are persuaded that Mr. Hedblum has established [8] that he suffered an industrial injury within the meaning of RCW 51.08.100 on April 18, 1987.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On April 29, 1987, the claimant filed an accident report with the Department of Labor and Industries alleging that he had suffered an industrial injury or a condition caused by an occupational disease on April 18, 1987 while working for U.S. Intelco Networks, Inc. On October 9, 1987, the Department issued an order rejecting the claim for the reasons that the condition was neither the result of an industrial injury nor an occupational disease, and that the condition preexisted the alleged injury and was not related thereto.
On October 14, 1987, the claimant filed a protest and request for reconsideration of the Department's order of October 9, 1987. On November 24, 1987, the Department issued an order holding its previous order of October 9, 1987 in abeyance. On April 27, 1988, the Department issued an order indicating that the claim would remain rejected pursuant to its previous order of October 9, 1987.
On May 26, 1988, a notice of appeal of the Department's order of April 27, 1988 was filed by the claimant with the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. On June 14, 1988 the Board issued an order granting the appeal, assigning it Docket No. 88 2237 and directed that proceedings be held on the issues raised.
2. As of April 18, 1987, the claimant was employed by U.S. Intelco Networks, Inc., as a senior analyst programmer.
3. On the morning of April 18, 1987 the claimant was working overtime in an attempt to complete a computer program scheduled to go into production on Monday, April 20, 1987. The claimant inadvertently deleted the program which meant the project could not be completed on schedule.
4. After realizing that the work on the program had been lost, the claimant suffered an anxiety reaction for which he received psychotherapy from a licensed clinical psychologist from May 12, 1987 through July 16, 1987. The anxiety reaction was caused by the emotional stress which occurred during the course of claimant's employment on the morning of April 18, 1987. [9]
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
- The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter to this appeal.
- On April 18, 1987 the claimant suffered an industrial injury as that term is defined in RCW 51.08.100.
- The order of the Department of Labor and Industries dated April 27, 1988 adhering to the provisions of a Department order of October 9, 1987 which rejected the claim on the basis that the condition was not the result of the exposure alleged; that there was no industrial injury as defined by the industrial insurance laws; that the condition preexisted the alleged industrial injury and was not related thereto; and that the condition was not an occupational disease, is incorrect and is reversed and this claim is remanded to the Department of Labor and Industries to issue an order allowing the claim as an industrial injury occurring on April 18, 1987 and to take further action as indicated.
It is so ORDERED.
Dated this 26th day of October, 1989.
BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS
/s/
SARA T. HARMONChairperson
/s/
FRANK E. FENNERTY, JR.Member
/s/
PHILLIP T. BORKMember
(1) 1This statutory provision is not retroactive to the present claim, but illustrates the clear distinction which is made between a mental/mental occupational disease and a mental/mental industrial injury.