| IN RE: BETH A. STRACENER | ) | DOCKET NO. 05 14952 |
| ) | ||
| CLAIM NO. Y-894348 | ) | DECISION AND ORDER |
| ) |
APPEARANCES:
Claimant, Beth A. Stracener,
Pro Se
Employer, LLC Foxes II, by
Law Office of Larry N. Johnson, PLLC, per
Larry N. Johnson
Department of Labor and Industries, by
The Office of the Attorney General, per
David I. Matlick, Assistant
The
employer, LLC Foxes II, filed an appeal with the Board of Industrial Insurance
Appeals on
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Pursuant
to RCW 51.52.104 and RCW 51.52.106, this matter is before the Board for review
and decision on a timely Petition for Review filed by the employer to a Proposed Decision and Order issued on
The
employer argues that several exhibits offered were rejected in error. They pertain to Department actions on other
claims that the employer believes are inconsistent with the Department
adjudication in this claim. We agree
with our industrial appeals judge that they are not relevant and should remain
rejected. Actions that the Department
takes in other claims pertain to each of those claims, and have no bearing to
the adjudication of this claim. It is
not the Board's role to ensure that the Department is consistent, even if it
were to know the facts of each individual claim. Each case must be decided on its own
merits. Relative to other evidentiary
matters, we have reviewed the rulings in the record of proceedings and find
that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are affirmed. [2]
The other issues presented by this appeal and the evidence
presented by the parties are adequately set forth in the Proposed Decision and
Order.
DECISION
This
comes before us on the employer's Petition for Review from our industrial
appeals judge's determination that the claimant was a worker as contemplated by
the Industrial Insurance Act. The
Department decided that this claim should be allowed. Ms. Stracener is a nightclub dancer. She performed at a club called Foxes, and was
also expected to make agreements with customers for private dances on Foxes'
premises. The employer argues that the
claimant is a lessee of its club "space" and is a sole proprietor,
not an employee or even an independent contractor, and is therefore excluded
from coverage under RCW 51.12.020(5). Alternatively, it argues that Ms. Stracener is excluded from coverage
pursuant to RCW 51.12.020(9), as an entertainer under a contract with a
purchaser of the services for a specific engagement not regularly or
continuously employed by the purchaser.
In
a stipulation of the parties, the parties indicated that each performer,
including the claimant, agrees to pay for "space" at the club and
dance or perform other services for the general public during the shift she
works and "produce the maximum gross sales possible from the premises
during the term of this lease for the benefit of both owner and performer; and assure
regular maximum operation of entertainment at the premises for the benefit of
both owner and performer . . .", among other provisions in the
agreement. Exhibit No. 1. Our industrial appeals judge found that the
claimant was an independent contractor, the essence of whose services were
personal labor. The "Performance
Lease" states that the lessee will pay a certain amount to the club, but
will perform during the allotted shifts to create as much revenue as
possible. Exhibit No. 1. She was to pay $15 an hour or $90 a shift,
(six hours) simply to use the stage, but obviously it was to Foxes'
benefit. This was a contract, but the
essence of the contract was clearly for Ms. Stracener's personal labor.
Beth
Stracener was a waitress at Foxes beginning in April 2004. She became interested in performing as a
dancer and an arrangement was reached. She discontinued her serving work and signed a "Performance Lease,"
(Exhibit No. 12), which, as stated above, provided that she would pay for the
space she occupied to dance at the premises and would provide entertainment at the club for the
entire time she was using the stage. She
was injured while performing on stage. In its [3] Petition for Review, the employer argues that
Ms. Stracener's activities were not personal labor. However, in attempting to submit more reasons
as to why Ms. Stracener was not engaged in her own personal labor, the
employer actually makes the case that Ms. Stracener was engaged in personal
labor; for instance, soliciting customers, and so on (Petition for Review, at
15). Such activity outlined in the
employer's Petition for Review does not require anything but personal
effort. Ms. Stracener supplied no
equipment or tools other than her clothes or costume. She required no assistance, and did not
employ others to either do, or enable her to do, her work. The contract stated that she could not
delegate or reassign her duties. The
provisions regarding Ms. Stracener's obligation to maximize her efforts to
perform during her allotted shifts and make as much money as possible for that
time were all to Foxes' benefit as well as her own. The case that is most relevant is the case
cited in the Proposed Decision and Order, Department
of Labor & Indus. v. Tacoma Yellow Cab, 31 Wn. App 117 (1982). In that case, cabbies leased the vehicles,
paying the cab company as lessors, but retaining the fares—similar to the
arrangement here in which Ms. Stracener paid the club for its venue and
kept all the fees she generated from the patrons. In each case, the essence of the labor, by
cabby or dancer, was personal. The court
said that it was necessary to look at the substance, not the form, of the
arrangement, and that the lease arrangement evaded the real issue—that personal
labor was the essence of the contract. This was the true purpose involved, even though the cab drivers were
able to use the cab that they drove for any legal purpose. The court stated that:
[W]e are reminded not to observe symbolic or
meaningless acts. Rather, we are urged,
in reviewing statutes which confer benefits, to 'look at the realities of the
situation.' (Citations omitted.) The realities are simply that the essence of the independent lease
contract is to provide a method to place taxis and drivers on the city streets
of
This is on point with the case before
us. The entertainment service was for
the benefit of the employer and its establishment. Foxes advertises itself as a place that
provides adult entertainment, and that is how it makes its revenue. Furthermore, in its Petition for Review, the
employer states that the entertainers contribute more than personal labor,
because the performer must approach a customer, develop dance routines,
maintain a certain appearance, and otherwise use her individual efforts. This is nothing if not personal labor. The assertions belie the argument, not
support it. Here, as in Tacoma Yellow Cab, the purpose of the
"independent lease" is to provide a method to make adult
entertainment available to the customers of the club. [4]
As
noted above, the employer also argues that the claimant's work was excluded
under RCW 51.12.020(9), which provides that among the exclusions from mandatory
coverage are:
Services rendered by a musician or entertainer under a
contract with a purchaser of the services, for a specific engagement or
engagements when such musician or entertainer performs no other duties for the
purchaser and is not regularly and continuously employed by the purchaser.
This
contention is incorrect. The dancers at
Foxes, including the claimant, do perform regularly and continuously for the
same employer. This does not involve one
specific or even a specific series of engagements; the contract contemplates an
ongoing relationship, unlike that with a band or other entertainer who performs
at a certain site and then moves on. Furthermore, the customer is the client of the club first and foremost,
and comes there to be entertained. The
claimant was there to provide just that kind of service on an ongoing basis for
the customers of Foxes, not just for her own benefit, but for the benefit of
Foxes' business. More than just an
engagement, or even a limited series of engagements was contemplated.
After consideration of the Proposed Decision and Order and
the Petition for Review filed thereto, the Department's
Response to Petition for Review, and a careful review of the entire record
before us, we are persuaded that the Proposed Decision and Order is supported
by the preponderance of the evidence and is correct as a matter of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On
2. On
3. The
essence of the Performance Lease was that Beth A. Stracener would provide
personal labor, in the form of adult entertainment dancing and solicitation of
customers for dances, for Foxes. The
only "equipment" provided by Ms. Stracener was her clothing or
costume.
4. Ms.
Stracener's work as a dancer did not involve services for a specific engagement
or engagements, and an ongoing relationship was contemplated.
5. On
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The
Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals has jurisdiction over the parties to and
the subject matter of this appeal.
2. At the
time of her
3. Ms.
Stracener was not excluded from mandatory coverage under the Industrial
Insurance Act as a sole proprietor within the meaning of RCW 51.12.020(5).
4. Ms.
Stracener was not excluded from mandatory coverage under the Industrial
Insurance Act as a musician or entertainer under a contract with a purchaser of
the services for a specific engagement or engagements who is not regularly and
continuously employed by the purchaser within the meaning of
RCW 51.12.020(9). [6]
5. The
It is so ORDERED.
Dated this
29th day of August, 2006.
BOARD
OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS
/s/_____________________________________
THOMAS
E. EGAN Chairperson
/s/_____________________________________
FRANK
E. FENNERTY, JR. Member
/s/_____________________________________
CALHOUN
